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ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS SINCERITY 
Nathan S. Chapman 
Abstract: Recent disputes about the “contraception mandate” under the Affordable Care 
Act and about the provision of goods and services for same-sex weddings have drawn 
attention to the law of religious accommodations. So far, however, one of the requirements of 
a religious accommodation claim has escaped sustained scholarly attention: a claimant must 
be sincere. Historically, scholars have contested this requirement on the ground that 
adjudicating religious sincerity requires government officials to delve too deeply into 
religious questions, something the Establishment Clause forbids. Until recently, however, the 
doctrine was fairly clear: though the government may not evaluate the objective accuracy or 
plausibility of a claimant’s religious beliefs, it may adjudicate whether the claimant holds 
those beliefs sincerely.  
Unfortunately, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby introduced confusion. The majority opinion 
appears to conflate the requirement that a claimant be sincere with the requirement that the 
claimant show that the government has “substantially burdened” the claimant’s religious 
exercise. The dissenting opinion, by contrast, suggests that courts simply may not adjudicate 
religious sincerity. The first of these mistakes muddies the water about the relationship 
between sincerity and the other elements of a religious accommodation claim; the second 
illustrates the ongoing confusion for many jurists and scholars about the constitutional 
concerns surrounding an inquiry into a claimant’s religious sincerity.  
This Article attempts to defend and clarify the sincerity requirement. Against the 
scholarly consensus, it argues that courts can and should adjudicate an accommodation 
claimant’s religious sincerity. Insincere claims impose costs on the government, third parties, 
and religious liberty itself. Courts can adjudicate sincerity, and reduce these costs, without 
violating the Establishment Clause. The Constitution’s “no-orthodoxy principle” should be 
understood to prohibit a court from inferring that a claimant is insincere merely because the 
claimant’s religious belief is implausible. Otherwise, a court should evaluate a claimant’s 
sincerity by applying the ordinary rules of evidence. Moreover, when the claimant’s sincerity 
is not in issue, a court should resist allowing its suspicion to affect the rest of its legal 
analysis. Finally, the Article clarifies the distinctions between whether a claimant is sincere, 
whether the claim is based on religious exercise, and whether the government has imposed a 
substantial burden on that exercise.  
                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to those who 
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INTRODUCTION 
Comedian John Oliver recently started a church, “Our Lady of 
Perpetual Exemption.”1 He wanted to expose the tax exemptions 
available to televangelists who exchange promises of prosperity for 
donations.2 Within weeks, Oliver had received tens of thousands of 
dollars.3 Oliver claimed the stunt was entirely legal—the church had 
been incorporated in Texas, had complied with IRS registration 
requirements, and was therefore entitled to receive unlimited donations 
tax-free.4 It wasn’t. Even considering the IRS’s fuzzy conception of 
“church,”5 “Our Lady” was missing a crucial component of a religious 
accommodation claim: sincerity.6 The scheme was, of course, a parody. 
By attempting to expose fraud, Oliver may have committed it. 
Oliver is not alone in his confusion about the legal relevance of a 
religious accommodation claimant’s sincerity. The black-letter law is 
pretty clear, but scholars question it and judges—including Supreme 
Court justices—misunderstand it. The rule is simple: to qualify for a 
religious accommodation, a claimant must demonstrate sincerity.7 
                                                     
1. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Televangelists (HBO broadcast Aug. 16, 2015), 
http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver/episodes/02/49-august-16-2105/video/ep-
49-clip-televangelists.html?autoplay=true [https://perma.cc/J3FX-LS8K] [hereinafter Last Week].  
2. See Abby Ohlheiser, Comedian John Oliver Takes On the Prosperity Gospel By Becoming a 
Televangelist, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2015/08/17/comedian-john-oliver-takes-on-the-prosperity-gospel-by-becoming-a-
televangelist [http://perma.cc/Z4QP-JNAN]. 
3. Daniel Kreps, John Oliver Shuts Down Fake Church Over Unsolicited Semen, ROLLING 
STONE (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/tv/news/john-oliver-shuts-down-fake-church-
over-unsolicited-semen-20150914 [http://perma.cc/53DZ-JD77]. 
4. See Last Week, supra note 1. 
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012) (lacking any definition of “church”); “Churches” Defined, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/churches-religious-organizations/churches-defined 
[https://perma.cc/Q7Z8-4W5A] (explaining “[t]he term church is found, but not specifically 
defined, in the Internal Revenue Code”). 
6. Interestingly, Oliver noted the sincerity requirement. See Last Week, supra note 1. The fact 
that he (and perhaps his lawyer) ignored it shows how unimportant they thought it was. Sometimes, 
though, courts do adjudicate a church’s sincerity. See Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. 
Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. 1981) (Wahl, J., concurring specially) (finding 
that the Tax Court’s sincerity analysis “is not clearly erroneous and should not be overturned here”); 
Ecclesiastical Order of the ISM of AM, Inc., v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 833, 842 n.14 (1983) (deciding the 
case on another ground though the government suspected the claimant was insincere). 
7. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (discussing the requirements 
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014) (discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1955) (conscientious objection provision of 
selective service statute); Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the 
Courts after Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 59–60 (2014) (“There is a long tradition 
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Courts and government officials adjudicate religious sincerity in a wide 
variety of contexts: fraud;8 immigration;9 employment discrimination;10 
prisoner religious accommodations;11 conscientious objection from 
service in the armed forces;12 and statutory accommodations from 
general laws.13 The requirement makes sense. The point of a religious 
accommodation is to reduce the burden that a law may impose on 
someone’s religious exercise. When a claimant is insincere, the law 
imposes no burden on religious exercise at all.14 
Yet scholars have long questioned the wisdom and constitutionality of 
adjudicating religious sincerity. Most of them have endorsed Justice 
Jackson’s dissenting opinion in the 1944 case United States v. Ballard.15 
The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment forbids the 
government from prosecuting persons on the ground that their religious 
beliefs are empirically inaccurate. Doing so requires the government to 
evaluate theological claims, something the Establishment Clause forbids. 
Justice Jackson would have gone further. He argued that courts should 
read the First Amendment to also prohibit the government from 
                                                     
of courts competently scrutinizing asserted religious beliefs for sincerity without delving into their 
validity or verity.”). 
8. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See generally Stephen Senn, The Prosecution of 
Religious Fraud, 17 FLA. ST. L. REV. 325 (1990). 
9. Jiang v. Holder, 341 F. App’x 126 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that substantial evidence 
supported conclusion of the immigration judge that Jiang submitted insufficient evidence to support 
her claim that she was a practitioner of Falun Gong); see Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 
1341, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) (Marcus, J., concurring) (“[W]hile the sovereign has a powerful interest 
in preventing aliens from filing fraudulent petitions for [religious] asylum, malingering is not at 
issue in this case.”). 
10. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485–87 (5th Cir. 2014); Adeyeye v. Heartland 
Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2013). 
11. See Andreola v. Doyle, 260 F. App’x 935, 935 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming jury verdict that 
prisoner’s beliefs were not sincere); Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 591 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (distinguishing between the truth of a religious belief and whether it is sincerely 
held). See generally Kevin L. Brady, Note, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing 
Prisoners Recover Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431 (2011). 
12. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 381; Hager v. Sec’y of Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Conscientious Objection, Army Reg. 600-43 (Aug. 21, 2006). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 723 (10th Cir. 2010) (denying 
accommodation from marijuana laws); Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 F. App’x 815, 
819 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying accommodation from immunization requirement). 
14. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 52–
53; Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1417 (1967) (“[W]here the individual’s conduct is repeatedly at variance with 
his avowed religious duties, restriction on his religious liberty is entirely academic—no serious 
injury is done to his conscience.”). 
15. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
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evaluating whether persons actually hold the religious beliefs they 
profess. His nuanced reasoning boiled down to the conviction that it is 
impossible to adjudicate religious sincerity without also passing 
judgment on whether the claimant’s beliefs are plausible.16 
Based largely on this argument, Professor Kent Greenawalt’s 
assessment probably reflects the mainstream view among legal scholars. 
“[S]ome inquiry into sincerity is often essential,” but “for just the 
reasons that Justice Jackson offered,” “alternative approaches [to 
adjudicating religious sincerity] are preferable if they are feasible.”17 
Some go further. Judge John Noonan argues that “Jackson seems to me 
right”18—“the first amendment requires” the government to abstain from 
inquiring into one’s religious sincerity.19 Even those scholars who accept 
that adjudicating religious sincerity may be a necessary evil suggest 
changing the ordinary rules of pleading and evidence to provide as much 
protection for claimants as possible.20 No one has offered a sustained 
defense of the adjudication of religious sincerity under the ordinary 
pleading and evidentiary standards.21 
                                                     
16. See id. at 92–93. 
17. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 
122–23 (2006); see also Giannella, supra note 14, at 1418 (concluding that while “Mr. Justice 
Jackson’s arguments are especially persuasive in cases where government would otherwise act to 
protect gullible citizens from spurious religious movements,” “precluding inquiry into sincerity 
seems inappropriate when individuals make claim for special treatment vis-à-vis the state” to protect 
from “dilution of government programs”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Apostle, Mr. Justice 
Jackson, and the “Pathological Perspective” of the Free Exercise Clause, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1071, 1984 (2008); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise 
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 957 (1989) (“Because sincerity is tantamount to ‘honesty’ or 
‘good faith,’ it may be necessary to, but it will rarely be sufficient as a screen for, free exercise 
claims.”); Anna Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, 51 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 28 (2016) 
[hereinafter Su, Judging Religious Sincerity]; Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion 30 Years 
On, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 10 (2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion] 
(“[O]ne can fairly wonder about the capacity of institutional decision makers, such as arbitrators or 
administrators of public benefits programs, to determine sincerity.”). 
18. John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
713, 720. 
19. Id. at 724. 
20. See KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: 
RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 280–83 (John Witte, Jr. ed., 2015); AVIGAIL 
EISENBERG, REASONS OF IDENTITY: A NORMATIVE GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
ASSESSMENT OF IDENTITY CLAIMS 103–11 (2009) (critically analyzing the way the Canadian 
Supreme Court relies on a sincerity analysis to determine eligibility for an accommodation under 
the Canadian Constitution). 
21. The most thorough defense of the practice to date appeared in a law review article thirty 
years ago. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299, 
325–31; see also Adams & Barmore, supra note 7; Peter J. Riga, Religion, Sincerity, and Free 
Exercise, 25 CATH. LAW. 246 (1980). As this paper goes to press, I have become aware of a 
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Uneasiness about adjudicating religious sincerity was limited to law 
reviews until the recent contraceptive mandate cases. During the oral 
argument in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,22 Justice Kagan suggested that it 
would be unconstitutional to “test the sincerity of religion.”23 Perhaps 
channeling the prevailing scholarly view, Justice Sotomayor called it 
“the most dangerous piece” of a religious accommodation analysis.24 
And Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, joined by three other 
justices, asserted that “a court must accept as true” a plaintiff’s “factual 
allegations that a plaintiff’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious 
nature.”25 
Yet it is unclear whether these justices believe that the First 
Amendment really precludes adjudication of religious sincerity. The 
term after Hobby Lobby was decided, the Court stated in a unanimous 
opinion that a religious accommodation claimant “bore the burden” of 
“showing that the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely 
held religious belief.”26 
Worse, none of the justices in Hobby Lobby, majority or dissenting, 
articulated a coherent distinction between adjudicating a claimant’s 
religious sincerity and determining whether the government has placed a 
“substantial burden” on the claimant’s religious exercise. Although 
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, emphasized that the penalties for 
failing to comply with the contraceptive mandate were a “substantial 
burden,”27 the opinion failed to persuasively respond to Justice 
Ginsburg’s charge that the Court’s analysis collapsed the sincerity and 
substantial burden requirements, effectively allowing the claimants to 
                                                     
forthcoming chapter that may complement this Article’s argument. See Karen Lowentheil & 
Elizabeth Reiner Platt, In Defense of the Sincerity Test, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS (Kevin Vallier 
and Michael Weber eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 247) (on file with the author). 
22. 573 U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, 356) 
(comments of Kagan, J.) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby Oral Argument]. 
24. Id. at 19–20 (Paul Clement: “I would think that the government in those kind of cases is 
really going to resist the sincerity piece of the analysis.” Sotomayor, J.: “That’s the most dangerous 
piece. That’s the one we’ve resisted in all our exercise jurisprudence, to measure the depth of 
someone’s religious beliefs”). But see Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 591 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (“The opinions of the DOCS religious authorities cannot trump the plaintiff’s 
sincere and religious belief.”). 
25. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 
553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
26. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., writing for a unanimous court). 
27. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778. 
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decide the issue for themselves.28 In the end, Hobby Lobby only 
exacerbated the confusion about whether and how to adjudicate religious 
sincerity.29 
This Article argues that courts can, and should, adjudicate religious 
sincerity. The analysis should proceed as any other factual determination 
of a party’s mental state, with one caveat: the Constitution prohibits 
courts from inferring insincerity from a religious belief’s inaccuracy or 
implausibility. Furthermore, when the claimant’s sincerity is not in 
issue—because the opponent has conceded the claimant’s sincerity or 
because the issue is not relevant given the case’s procedural posture—
the court should not allow its suspicion about the claimant’s insincerity 
to affect its analysis of the other elements of an accommodation claim. 
Courts can, and should, carefully distinguish between three concepts: 
whether a claimant is sincere, whether the claimant’s acts or omissions 
are religious, and whether the government’s regulation imposes a 
“substantial burden” on that “religious exercise.” 
Part I of the Article explains the constitutional principle that frames 
the disputes about adjudicating religious sincerity. Based on multiple 
constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has articulated a number of 
doctrines that arise from what this Article calls the “no-orthodoxy 
principle”: the government may not distribute benefits and burdens on its 
own evaluation of religious truth. 
As Part II discusses, one of the doctrines based on this principle is 
that the government may not evaluate the plausibility or accuracy of 
one’s religious beliefs. Many scholars believe that this prohibition 
effectively rules out the adjudication of religious sincerity too. As 
Justice Jackson argued long ago, it is hard to distinguish between the 
likelihood that a religious belief is accurate and the likelihood that the 
                                                     
28. See id. at 2798–99; Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2812 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May 
(And Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 98, 102 
(2017); Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 44–45. 
29. See Su, Judging Religious Sincerity supra note 17, at 45 (“At this jurisprudential moment 
then, it is clear that the twin legal threshold of sincerity and substantial burden are all but such in 
practice.”). Compare, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 28, at 98–99, 102 (arguing that courts should 
evaluate, on the basis of “secular law,” whether the claimant will suffer “substantial religious costs” 
as well as “substantial secular costs”), with Chad Flanders, Insubstantial Burdens, in RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTIONS (Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 281) (on 
file with the author) (arguing that “courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on 
their religious belief” so long as the claimant shows “that the government is actually doing 
something to the plaintiffs”), and Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1771, 1775 (arguing that “in order to determine whether a burden is substantial, courts must 
examine the substantiality of the civil penalties triggered by religious exercise”). 
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claimant actually believes it. After carefully engaging with Justice 
Jackson’s argument, Part II concludes that, though his premise was 
sound, his conclusion does not follow. Courts can adjudicate religious 
sincerity without running afoul of the no-orthodoxy principle by 
declining to infer from evidence of a belief’s inaccuracy or 
implausibility that the claimant is insincere. 
But should they? Some argue that the constitutional risks of 
adjudicating religious sincerity should lead courts to err on the side of 
caution. As Part III of the Article argues, these scholars discount the 
costs of declining to enforce religious sincerity. Some of these costs are 
obvious. Fraud, whether based on religious claims or not, harms 
innocent people and soaks up public resources. A hands-off approach to 
religious sincerity invites false claims, which multiply litigation costs 
and, when granted, impose costs on taxpayers and perhaps third 
parties—all without relieving a burden from genuine religious exercise. 
As Part III suggests, there are also subtler costs when courts believe 
they cannot adjudicate religious sincerity. Suspicion that a claimant is 
insincere won’t just disappear; it is likely to creep into the court’s 
analysis of other elements of the accommodation claim. Moreover, the 
widespread belief that “religious liberty” protects hucksters may erode 
public support for religious accommodations altogether. Perhaps 
counter-intuitively, adjudicating religious sincerity according to the no-
orthodoxy principle may be the best way to promote religious liberty 
among those who are suspicious of phony claims.30 
As this Article explains in Part IV, courts have all the tools they need 
to do just that. Officials routinely evaluate the sincerity of witnesses and 
the mental state of those accused of engaging in negligent 
misrepresentation or knowing fraud. When they adjudicate religious 
sincerity, courts must simply avoid inferring insincerity from inaccuracy, 
something that could be accomplished in a jury trial with an ordinary 
limiting instruction. This would permit a wide range of evidence that is 
highly probative of religious sincerity: evidence of ulterior motives; 
evidence of whether the claim “fits” with the claimant’s religious 
biography; and evidence of whether the claim “fits” with the beliefs of 
the claimant’s religious community (if any). 
                                                     
30. “The main components of religious liberty are the autonomy of religious institutions, 
individual choice in matters of religion, and the freedom to put a chosen faith (if any) into practice.” 
McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 14, at 1; see Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion, supra 
note 17, at 5 (noting that McConnell’s definition of religious liberty “just about covered the 
waterfront”). 
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Having addressed how to adjudicate religious sincerity, the Article 
concludes in Part V by sorting out the confusion about sincerity and 
“substantial burden” in Hobby Lobby. Disentangling “sincerity,” 
“religious exercise,” and “substantial burden” clarifies the disagreement 
between the majority and dissenting justices. It also allows for a robust 
response to the dissenting justices’ charge that the majority collapsed the 
sincerity and “substantial burden” analyses, effectively deferring to the 
claimant’s view on the issue. The claimants’ sincerity was not in issue. 
Their “religious exercise” was abstaining from buying contraceptive 
insurance and the “substantial burden” was the threatened fine for that 
religious exercise. Contrary to the dissenting justices, the religiously 
inspired moral reasoning that supported the claimants’ “religious 
exercise” was legally immaterial to their sincerity, to the nature of the 
“exercise” at issue, and to whether the regulation imposed a “substantial 
burden” on that exercise. Perhaps Congress should more carefully define 
the “substantial burden” component of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).31 Until it does, however, this Article suggests 
that courts, guided by the statutory text and prior cases, can distinguish 
between a claimant’s sincerity, whether the claim is based on religious 
exercise, and whether the regulation at issue imposes a substantial 
burden on that exercise. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S NO-ORTHODOXY PRINCIPLE 
Professor Ana Su has noted that “[t]he emergence of the sincerity 
requirement as a species of the religious question doctrine is a topic that 
is yet to be addressed by scholars in this field.”32 This Part explains that 
concerns about adjudicating sincerity, and the “religious question 
doctrine” from which those concerns arise, are based more 
fundamentally in a constitutional principle that the government may not 
take a position on the accuracy of private religious beliefs. The “no-
orthodoxy principle,” as this Article calls it, arises from several 
constitutional provisions, and the Supreme Court has applied it in a 
variety of contexts. Evaluating disputes about the government’s role in 
adjudicating religious sincerity requires comprehending the principle’s 
                                                     
31. Many debate the desirability of the current religious accommodation regime. Whether the 
terms of that regime are optimal is beyond this Article’s scope. Changing them would not change 
the Article’s core thesis: courts can and should directly address suspicion about the claimant’s 
insincerity, and courts can and should avoid allowing such suspicion to influence the analysis of the 
other components of an accommodation claim. 
32. Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 30 n.6. 
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origins, applications, and implications—and the limits of those 
implications. 
A. Origins 
The American framers broke with their English and colonial 
experience to place religious truth beyond the government’s ken. The 
protestant Church of England had been the established religion since the 
sixteenth century.33 The Church maintained positions on several 
Christian doctrines that were hotly contested both within the nation and 
across Europe, doctrines about the nature of God and about what 
happens to the bread and wine used during the Christian celebration of 
Eucharist or Communion.34 To participate fully in England’s politics, 
academics, and the legal profession, one had to subscribe to the 
established church’s doctrines and participate in its ceremonies.35 
As is well known, dissenters from the English religious establishment 
founded several of the American colonies.36 Many of the colonies did 
not dissent from the notion of an established religion altogether, 
however—they simply preferred to establish a different Christian 
denomination. The New England colonies, in particular, adopted 
congregational puritanism instead of Anglicanism as their established 
religion.37 Meanwhile, most of the Southern colonies officially favored 
the Church of England until after the War of Independence.38 
The framers of the United States Constitution did away with religious 
tests for participation in government. Tucked into Article VI, better 
known for establishing federal law as “the supreme Law of the Land,”39 
the Religious Test Clause provides that “no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States.”40 At the time, most states required officials to subscribe 
to Christianity or Protestantism.41 Though some Americans protested the 
Religious Test Clause during the ratification debates, advocates of the 
                                                     
33. See, e.g., DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE LATER REFORMATION IN ENGLAND 1547–1603 
(1990). 
34. See id. 
35. See Test Act of 1672, 25 Car. 2, ch. 2; Corporation Act of 1661, 13 Car. 2, stat. 2., c. 1. 
36. See generally MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN IN THE WILDERNESS (1965). 
37. SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 133 (1902). 
38. Id. at 74. 
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
41. See COBB, supra note 37, at 510–17.  
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Constitution defended it with two arguments. First, without the 
provision, one religious group, or a plurality of groups, would be able to 
exclude others from fully participating in the government, effectively 
rendering them second-class citizens.42 Second, without the provision, 
the narrow-minded prejudice of some might discourage members of 
disfavored religious groups who nevertheless exhibited republican 
virtues from taking public office.43 
As Gerard Bradley has argued, the Religious Test Clause has been 
self-executing. Because it operates even-handedly, no one has ever been 
subject to a religious test for federal office, and the clause has never 
given rise to a legal dispute.44 The provision created a powerful baseline 
of religious equality by ensuring that no one would be excluded from 
federal office on account of religion. Such equality, even without the 
Establishment or Free Exercise Clause, likewise extended a measure of 
religious liberty to non-Christians by eliminating an incentive to ascribe 
to a form of Christianity in exchange for access to public office.45 
To quell concerns that the federal government would engage in 
religious favoritism, the First Congress enacted the First Amendment,46 
which forbids Congress from making any “law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”47 The 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause were the capstones on 
the Constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom and equality. Broadly 
understood, they promised that the federal government would never 
grant political or civil rewards or impose legal burdens on the basis of 
religious belief and exercise. The First Amendment furthermore 
                                                     
42. OLIVER ELLSWORTH, THE LANDHOLDER, VII, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 167, 169 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (noting that if a religious oath 
“were in favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians, episcopalions, baptists, or quakers, it 
would incapacitate more than three-fourths of the American citizens for any publick office; and thus 
degrade them from the rank of freemen”). 
43. Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution of the United States of America, PA. 
GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1787, at 2 (“The people may employ any wise or good citizen in the execution of 
the various duties of the government.”). 
44. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: 
A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987); see also MORTON 
BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS (1984). 
45. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke’s 
“Constitution of Freedom,” 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 393.  
46. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Vincent Philip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083 
(2008).  
47. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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guaranteed the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of the people 
peaceably to assemble, each of which derived in part from English 
common law accommodations for religious and political dissenters.48 
Altogether, with the Test Clause, these provisions promoted religious 
liberty and equality. 
Early Americans advanced an array of justifications for religious 
equality and liberty, some secular and others religious.49 All of them, 
though, supported the principle that the government should not dispense 
benefits and burdens on the basis of one’s religious beliefs. All except 
one, that is. Civic republicans believed that religion promoted virtue, and 
the development of public virtue was necessary for a republic to function 
properly.50 Many civic republicans therefore believed that the 
government should advance religiosity through education and public 
ceremonies, and to some extent America continues to have vestiges of 
“civic religion.”51 Civic republicans were not concerned that religious 
minorities would be made to feel like political outsiders by the 
government’s support for ceremonial religious practices. But some of 
them, at least, were keenly committed to eliminating political burdens 
imposed on religious minorities on account of their beliefs.52 Together, 
the Religious Test Clause, Establishment Clause, and Free Exercise 
Clause were understood to eliminate such burdens and to promote 
political equality among citizens despite their disparate and constantly 
evolving religious beliefs. 
B. Developing the No-Orthodoxy Principle 
Although the outer bounds of these constitutional provisions are hotly 
contested today, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
government may generally take no position on religious doctrine. The 
Supreme Court has developed this no-orthodoxy principle on the basis of 
a variety of First Amendment provisions, and has applied it in a variety 
of contexts. In United States v. Ballard, the Court held that the 
Constitution forbids passing judgment on the accuracy of a religious 
                                                     
48. See JOHN INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 20–62 
(2012). 
49. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 377–88 (1996). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 380–88. 
52. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode 
Island (Aug. 18, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, JULY-NOV. 1790, 284, 285 
(Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996). 
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accommodation claimant’s beliefs, but not on the claimant’s sincerity.53 
Scholars continue to maintain that the Constitution ought to extend to 
sincerity too. To better evaluate those arguments, this section provides a 
brief overview of the breadth—and limits—of the no-orthodoxy 
principle. 
The principle found its first clear expression in a case involving a 
dispute over church property. In Watson v. Jones,54 the Supreme Court 
concluded that, under general common law, state courts could not 
resolve property disputes that turn on the interpretation of religious 
doctrine: 
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious 
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any 
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality 
and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is 
conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to 
the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.55 
As the Court stated nearly a century later in another church property 
dispute, “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church 
property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of 
controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”56 These values, 
explained Justice Brennan, include “the free development of religious 
doctrine” and avoiding the imposition of “secular interests” on “matters 
of purely ecclesiastical concern.”57 The first sounds in free exercise, both 
individually and collectively, the latter in church autonomy. The Court 
has extended this principle to other cases involving disputes over church 
property,58 and to other cases involving a church’s selection of its own 
ministers (sometimes called the “ministerial exception”).59 
                                                     
53. 322 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1944). 
54. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
55. Id. at 728. 
56. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 
(1976) (“the First Amendment commits” “the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies” 
“exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals”); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 
190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
59. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) 
(holding that a “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination law is required by the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause). 
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Courts refer to the prohibition on deciding disputes about religious 
truth as the “religious question” doctrine.60 Scholars variously call it the 
“no religious decision”61 principle or the “hands-off approach”62 to 
religious questions. They offer a variety of justifications: “religious truth 
by its nature [is] not subject to a test of validity determined by rational 
thought and empiric knowledge”;63 courts are incompetent to understand 
religious ideas;64 the government will harm or corrupt religion by getting 
involved in it;65 and “secular authorities lack the power to answer” 
“religious questions” “whose resolution is” “left to other [ecclesiastical] 
institutions.”66 Usually a combination of these rationales supports a 
court’s abstention from deciding a dispute over religious doctrine.67 
For purposes of the present inquiry, however, the religious question 
doctrine, and the church dispute cases usually associated with it, is best 
understood as a species of the no-orthodoxy principle applied to judicial 
power. The no-orthodoxy principle, drawn from a variety of 
constitutional provisions, more broadly prohibits the government from 
distributing benefits and burdens on the basis of religious doctrine. This 
promotes religious liberty, both individual and corporate, and political 
equality before the law. A court’s resolution of a private contest about 
religious doctrine would throw the government’s power behind the 
winning belief, thereby distributing secular benefits and burdens on the 
basis of the government’s view of religious doctrine.68 
                                                     
60. See, e.g., Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D.D.C. 1990). Some 
scholars have questioned whether the doctrine leaves some litigants without a way to enforce what 
they believe to be their rights under civil law. See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 493, 501 (2013). 
61. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 901–10 (4th ed. 2011). 
62. Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking 
About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 837 (2009). 
63. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1232 n.46 (2d ed. 1988) 
(quoting PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1964)). See generally Caleb E. 
Mason, What Is Truth? Setting the Bounds of Justiciability in Religiously-Inflected Fast Disputes, 
26 J.L. & RELIGION 91 (2011). 
64. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714, 
714 n.8 (1976) (“Civil judges obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in 
applying the ‘law’ that governs ecclesiastical disputes. . . .”). 
65. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009). 
66. Garnett, supra note 62, at 861. 
67. For a thoughtful critique of each justification, and an argument that the central animating 
justification for the “hands-off approach” ought to be that “the political authority lacks power, or 
jurisdiction, to answer,” id., and for religious questions, see id. at 855–62. 
68. See Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 997 (1978) (“[B]ehind every [American] 
judge stands ultimately the naked power of the 101st Airborne. . . .”). On the relationship between 
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A corollary of the “religious question” doctrine is the First 
Amendment prohibition on the government determining the “centrality” 
of a religious belief to a religion.69 Ascertaining what is central to a 
particular religious system or tradition, and what is periphery, is an 
aspect of defining religious orthodoxy.70 Accordingly, the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and RFRA 
protect “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central 
to, a system of religious belief.”71 Whether a religious belief is 
“sincerely held is different” from whether it is “central” to a religion,72 
but the two can be easily confused.73 The difference is crucial, though. 
Determining the centrality of a belief requires evaluating the relationship 
between one belief of one person to an entire theology, belief system, 
and practice, in all its diversity. This requires determining the center of a 
theology, something about which coreligionists often disagree. A court 
may not do so without preferring one theological position to another, 
thus violating the no-orthodoxy principle. Adjudicating religious 
sincerity, however, focuses on whether the claimant actually believes the 
religious claim, not its relationship to other theological claims.74 As 
explained below, adjudicating sincerity does not, and should not, entail a 
judgment about the centrality or veracity of the religious claim itself. 
The Supreme Court has likewise enforced the no-orthodoxy principle 
in cases involving coerced religious speech. Holding that West Virginia 
could not require public school students to salute the flag against their 
religious beliefs, Justice Jackson unfurled some of the most stirring 
rhetoric to grace the U.S. Reports: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force to confess by word or act their faith therein.75 
                                                     
state action, the distribution of private rights, and the Establishment Clause, see generally Nathan S. 
Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and Town of Greece, 24 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 405 (2015) [hereinafter Chapman, State Action]. 
69. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (noting a constitutional prohibition on 
determining “the place of a particular belief in a religion”); see also Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 
U.S. 680 (1989). 
70. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012); id. § 2000bb-2(4) (referring to section 2000cc-5). 
72. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 459 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). 
73. See Hobby Lobby Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 19–20 (comments of Sotomayor, J.). 
74. See, e.g., Watts, 459 F.3d at 1295 (“The test is sincerity, not centrality.”). Whether the belief 
is “religious” is another matter. See infra section V.A. 
75. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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Under the Free Speech Clause, the Court thus extended the no-
orthodoxy principle to protect private speech on all matters of 
“opinion.”76 
Although the Test Clause proved to be self-enforcing against the 
federal government, the Supreme Court has extended its prohibition to 
the states under the auspices of the Establishment Clause. In Torcaso v. 
Watkins,77 the Court held that Maryland may not require notary publics 
to swear that they believe in God.78 Although many of the constitutional 
framers likely would have condoned excluding non-theists from public 
office,79 Torcaso extends protection equally to atheists and agnostics 
under the Establishment Clause. 
Many of the contemporary cases that may seem to call the no-
orthodoxy principle into question actually reinforce it. The Supreme 
Court has held that the government may sometimes display religious 
symbols, including the Ten Commandments, on its property.80 Although 
the Court has rarely achieved a majority opinion in these cases, the 
justices who voted for the constitutionality of such displays have 
uniformly emphasized that the government, in displaying religious 
symbols, is not thereby promoting the veracity of the religious beliefs 
those symbols represent.81 Rather, the government is acknowledging the 
role of religion among its citizens, recalling historical events, or 
promoting a spirit of civic unity (however ineffectively).82 What the 
government is not doing, the justices maintain, is saying that one 
religion is true and others are false.83 The reason the justices who have 
voted to uphold religious displays rely on this argument, I would submit, 
                                                     
76. Including the opinion that one should “Live Free or Die.” See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment forbids New Hampshire from requiring Jehovah’s 
Witnesses from displaying the state motto on their automobile license plates). 
77. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
78. Id. at 495. 
79. Indeed some ratification advocates defended the Test Clause on the ground that the Oath 
Clause would exclude atheists. See Bradley, supra note 44.  
80. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of a Ten 
Commandments monument because of its history and secular presentation). 
81. Id. at 691–92. 
82. See id. But see McCreary Co. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that framed copies of 
the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses violated the Establishment Clause because their 
purpose was to promote religion). 
83. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating “few individuals, whatever 
their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood the [Ten Commandments] monument as 
amounting . . . to a government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote 
religion over nonreligion, to ‘engage in’ any ‘religious practice[e],’ to ‘compel’ any ‘religious 
practic[e],’ or to ‘work deterrence’ of any ‘religious belief’”). 
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is that affirmatively promoting one religion over another would test the 
limits of the no-orthodoxy principle. 
Another group of cases permit the government to endorse a form of 
civic religion that has little theological content beyond theism. The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in legislative prayer and ceremonial religious 
speech cases may be best understood to permit the government to 
engage in generic religious speech meant primarily to unite the political 
community rather than to endorse religious orthodoxy.84 Indeed, the 
more likely it is that an observer would attribute coherent and specific 
religious speech to the government, as opposed to a private party, the 
less likely it is that the speech is constitutional.85 The cases undoubtedly, 
however, permit the government to promote theism over atheism.86 It is 
questionable whether these decisions can be squared with the no-
orthodoxy principle. 
It must be noted that the no-orthodoxy principle does not preclude the 
government from deciding issues related to religion.87 The First 
Amendment itself distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of 
religion—just not on the basis of particular theological beliefs (or the 
absence of them). On one hand, the Establishment Clause prohibits the 
government from making a “law respecting an [E]stablishment of 
religion.”88 On the other, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the 
government from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.89 In the 
course of making and enforcing law, therefore, the government cannot 
avoid deciding matters that touch on religion and religious beliefs.90 But 
it may not take a position on their relative merit in a way that affects 
civil rights and liberties. 
The no-orthodoxy principle poses a problem for adjudicating religious 
sincerity. The government may not distribute benefits and burdens on 
                                                     
84. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) (stating that 
prayers before town board meetings fall within the tradition of legislative prayers by promoting 
“universal themes, e.g., by calling for a ‘spirit of cooperation’”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
792 (1983) (stating opening prayers, which have been present throughout the history of the United 
States, were not meant to proselytize or approve one religious view, but were seen as “conduct 
whose . . . effect harmonize[d] with the tenets of some or all religions” (quoting McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961))). 
85. See Chapman, State Action, supra note 68. 
86. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819. 
87. See Garnett, supra note 62, at 850–54. 
88. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
89. Id. 
90. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure 
Observance of Practice with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 843 (1998). 
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the basis of religious truth, but it can be difficult to distinguish between 
whether a religious claim is “true” and whether the claimant “truly” 
believes it. Whether the no-orthodoxy principle, as I have described it, 
prohibits courts from inquiring into a claimant’s sincerity was 
effectively the issue in United States v. Ballard, and many scholars 
remain uneasy with the Court’s conclusion. 
II. THE BALLARD RULE AND JACKSON’S DISSENT 
The no-orthodoxy principle discussed above is the impetus for 
scholarly disputes about the government’s proper role in adjudicating 
religious sincerity. Most scholars endorse the view of Justice Jackson, 
dissenting in United States v. Ballard, that it is nearly impossible to 
adjudicate religious sincerity without also deciding the accuracy or 
plausibility of the claimant’s religious beliefs.91 This Part critiques 
Jackson’s opinion, concluding courts may address most, but not all, of 
the concerns he and subsequent scholars have identified. The next Part 
discusses the costs to the government, third parties, and religious liberty 
when government officials declined to adjudicate religious sincerity. 
                                                     
91. See GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 122–23; Giannella, supra note 14, at 1418; 
Krotozynski, supra note 17, at 1984; Lupu, supra note 17, at 957; Noonan, supra note 18, at 720–
21; Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 28; Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion, 
supra note 17, at 10. In Reasons of Identity, Avigail Eisenberg provides a critical analysis of the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s reliance on a religious claimant’s sincerity, alone, to determine 
eligibility for a religious accommodation under the Canadian Constitution. EISENBERG, supra note 
20, at 103–11. She acknowledges that evaluating a claimant’s sincerity, rather than the validity of 
the claimant’s belief, “is at least designed to distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims in a 
manner that avoids privileging the established tenets of religious faith according to religious elites; 
that takes seriously the relation between identity assessments and the subjective nature of religious 
belief; and that potentially broadens the scope of religious freedom so that it is more inclusive of 
religious minorities.” Id. at 107. At the same time, from the standpoint of protecting minority 
identity, she argues that courts should consider more than just the plaintiff’s sincerity. They should 
also consider the “collective dimension” of the claim, id. at 108, and “the general character of [the] 
religion, the practices it plausibly includes, and the role and importance of these practices to the 
religion,” id. at 109. Relying on these considerations to determine the value of the claimant’s 
religious exercise would raise serious concerns under the no-orthodoxy principle because they 
would potentially require courts to decide among competing understandings of the religion at issue. 
Under many U.S. religious accommodation statutes, such as RFRA, claimants are required to show 
not only sincerity, but also that the government has placed a substantial burden on the claimant’s 
religious exercise. As I argue in section V.B, this requirement is not onerous, but it is sufficiently 
distinct from the requirement of religious sincerity to prevent the analysis from turning exclusively 
on the claimant’s good faith. 
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A. The Ballard Rule: Adjudicate Religious Sincerity, Not Accuracy 
In United States v. Ballard, the Supreme Court held that the 
government may not punish persons on the ground that their religious 
beliefs are inaccurate.92 The Court tacitly suggested that courts may 
adjudicate a religious claimant’s sincerity and perhaps even punish those 
who defraud others by making false statements about their own religious 
beliefs.93 
The Court did not expressly distinguish between two forms of 
truthfulness upon which philosophers rely: sincerity and accuracy.94 The 
distinction, explored at length by Bernard Williams, is crucial for 
identifying the limits of the no-orthodoxy principle.95 At its most basic, 
accuracy is the disposition of “acquiring a correct belief in the first 
place, and . . . transporting that belief in a reliable form” to others.96 
Sincerity, by contrast, is the disposition “to say what one actually 
believes.”97 
The defendants in Ballard claimed to hold unusual religious beliefs, 
including that they had the power to cure illness.98 In the process, they 
made a great deal of money from converts and those who sought 
healing.99 The government indicted them on multiple charges of mail 
fraud.100 Before trial the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
prosecution violated their First Amendment rights.101 At trial, the 
government and the defendants agreed that the jury would not decide 
whether the defendants’ statements were actually false—only whether 
                                                     
92. 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944). 
93. Id. (explaining that the First Amendment placed the truth or falsity of the defendant’s beliefs 
beyond the government’s reach, but declining to decide whether the defendant’s sincerity was 
likewise beyond the government’s reach). For a wonderful account of the case and its progress 
through the federal courts, see JOHN NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139–76 (1998). 
94. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–88; BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN 
ESSAY IN GENEALOGY (2002). 
95. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 94. 
96. Id. at 37. 
97. Id. at 44. Williams describes accuracy and sincerity as “virtues of truth” because in order to 
exercise them one must overcome certain forms of resistance, including the “temptation” “to fantasy 
and the wish.” Id. at 38, 44–45. He develops the dispositions and forms of resistance for each of 
these virtues at length. See id. at 84–122 (sincerity); id. at 123–48 (accuracy). 
98. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80. 
99. See id. 
100. Id. at 79.  
101. Id. at 81. 
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they knew them to be false.102 In other words, the jury could find the 
defendants guilty only if it concluded that they had been insincere about 
their religious beliefs. And it did so.103 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the question before the jury was 
improper because it did not square with the indictment. The indictment, 
they argued, required the government to show that the content of the 
defendants’ claims were untrue, not only that the defendants “well 
knew” them to be untrue.104 The appellate court agreed with the 
defendants, holding that under the terms of the indictment, the 
government was obligated to prove that the defendants’ claims were 
inaccurate, not merely insincere.105 
Whether the government may try the veracity of one’s religious 
beliefs was the issue before the Supreme Court. The Court concluded 
that the First Amendment foreclosed the government from passing 
judgment on the accuracy of the defendants’ religious beliefs.106 Writing 
for the Court, Justice Douglas offered a paean to the no-orthodoxy 
principle: 
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, 
is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to 
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which 
are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials 
are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they 
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious 
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as 
life to some may be incomprehensible to others.107 
After emphasizing the religious freedom at stake, Douglas clarified 
that any other rule would invite official distinctions on the basis of 
theological bias: 
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem 
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those 
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding 
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the 
religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake 
                                                     
102. Id. at 81–82. 
103. Id. at 79. 
104. Id. at 80. 
105. Id. at 83. 
106. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, saw no reason why the government could not introduce 
evidence to the effect that the defendant had never healed anyone and had never been in San 
Francisco (despite claiming he met St. Germain there). Id. at 89. 
107. Id. at 86. 
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that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First Amendment 
does not select any one group or any one type of religion for 
preferred treatment.108 
The rule that the First Amendment forbids the government from 
evaluating the accuracy of an individual’s religious beliefs has become 
an entrenched application of the no-orthodoxy principle. 
The Court did not squarely hold that the government may adjudicate 
religious sincerity and punish insincere statements that amount to fraud, 
but its disposition of the case strongly implied that result. It declined to 
agree—twice—with Jackson’s powerful arguments that the First 
Amendment prohibits prosecutions for religious insincerity.109 
B. Justice Jackson’s Dissenting Opinion: The No-Orthodoxy 
Principle and Religious Sincerity 
Jackson agreed with the majority that the First Amendment places the 
accuracy of one’s religious beliefs beyond the government’s 
competence; he disagreed, however, about whether the First Amendment 
likewise places one’s religious sincerity beyond the government’s 
adjudicative authority. Though his objections arose in a case about 
criminal punishment, they apply with equal force to any governmental 
adjudication of religious sincerity, including a court’s evaluation of a 
religious accommodation claim. Furthermore, most scholars seem to be 
persuaded by Jackson’s account,110 which remains the most thorough 
and nuanced critique of the government’s authority to adjudicate 
religious sincerity. Therefore this section carefully considers his three 
arguments in turn. Each of them arises from a concern that judging 
religious sincerity would violate the no-orthodoxy principle, 
jeopardizing religious liberty and equality. 
                                                     
108. Id. at 87. 
109. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (quashing the indictment on the ground 
that the district court had excluded women from the grand jury pool). In my view, the Court’s best 
option in Ballard was to quash the indictment on the ground that its allegations, as framed, could 
not be established without determining the accuracy of the defendant’s claims. The indictment 
charged that the claims were false and that the defendants “well knew” them to be false. Ballard, 
322 U.S. at 80. It did not separately allege that the defendants falsely claimed to hold particular 
beliefs. Another indictment should have been framed to focus solely on whether the defendants 
believed what they said, without regard to whether those beliefs or statements accorded with 
objective reality. Whether the mail fraud statute can sustain an indictment and conviction on the 
basis of the speaker’s insincerity alone is a separate matter of statutory interpretation. 
110. See supra notes 17–20. 
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1. The Relationship Between Plausibility and Sincerity 
Jackson’s first argument was that it is difficult, both conceptually and 
as a matter of proof under the rules of evidence, to separate a statement’s 
plausibility, if not its accuracy, from the speaker’s likely sincerity.111 
The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to 
show that they have been true in his experience. Likewise, that 
one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he 
said happened never did happen. How can the Government 
prove these persons knew something to be false which it cannot 
prove to be false? If we try religious sincerity severed from 
religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very 
considerations which in common experience provide its most 
reliable answer.112 
Here, Jackson identifies a powerful reason for courts to tread 
carefully when reviewing a claimant’s religious sincerity. His overriding 
concern is the no-orthodoxy principle. Evidence tending to show a 
statement’s inaccuracy is also probative of whether the speaker believed 
it. Unless the speaker has admitted that she does not believe the 
statement, her sincerity must be proved (or disproved) by circumstantial 
evidence. The best circumstantial evidence that someone knew his 
statement to be false, maintains Jackson, is evidence that it was false—
which is precisely what the Court places out-of-bounds.113 It is therefore 
nearly impossible, he argues, to distinguish sincerity (permitted) from 
accuracy (forbidden). 
Jackson is correct that evidence of a statement’s inaccuracy is 
probative of the speaker’s sincerity. One might go even further than 
Jackson did. What matters is not so much whether a statement is 
accurate; people often sincerely believe things that turn out to be 
inaccurate. For example, when a home seller says, “I thought the deck 
was structurally sound,” the fact that it subsequently collapsed is some 
evidence, perhaps, that the seller was insincere. But in most people’s 
experience, it is reasonable to believe a deck is structurally sound absent 
contrary evidence. It is the reasonableness or plausibility of the belief 
that bears on the speaker’s sincerity, not the accuracy of it. And what is 
reasonable or plausible depends on one’s experience. In an ordinary 
                                                     
111. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 92 (stating, “I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is 
believed from considerations as to what is believable”). 
112. Id. at 92–93. 
113. Chief Justice Stone and two others thought that examining the objective veracity of 
religious claims would be fine. Id. at 89–90. 
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case, a factfinder’s experience can be, and often is, supplemented by 
expert witnesses and other evidence. But unlike the seller’s belief that a 
deck is structurally sound, whether a religious belief is plausible must be 
placed, alongside its accuracy, beyond the government’s authority by the 
no-orthodoxy principle. 
So, to give Jackson’s objection its due weight, it is not only evidence 
that a belief is inaccurate that the no-orthodoxy principle rules out, but 
also evidence that the belief is implausible or unreasonable. As Part V 
argues, the ordinary rules of evidence do not address this constitutional 
concern. Courts should take it into account when they adjudicate 
sincerity by prohibiting the factfinder from inferring religious insincerity 
from implausibility. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
government may not adjudicate religious sincerity. As the next Part 
explains, they have good reason to do so, and as Part V explains, they 
can do so without violating the no-orthodoxy principle. 
2. The Nonbeliever’s Bias 
Jackson’s second objection has to do with whether a nonbelieving 
adjudicator can relate to a believer. He argues, “any inquiry into 
intellectual honesty in religion raises profound psychological 
problems.”114 Citing William James, “who wrote on these matters as a 
scientist,” he argues that religion is deeply experiential.115 James 
“reminds us that it is not theology and ceremonies which keep religion 
going. Its vitality is in the religious experiences of many people.”116 
Nonbelievers have never had the experiences that spurred the claimant’s 
belief, and therefore they “are likely not to understand and are almost 
certain not to believe him.”117 
This argument is rich with irony. In the first place, Jackson, deciding 
a case as a justice on the Supreme Court, is appealing to the authority of 
religious studies (namely the religious psychology of William James) to 
argue that the government should not evaluate religious beliefs.118 To be 
sure, James was not espousing a particular religious belief or doctrine, 
but he was certainly espousing a viewpoint about religious beliefs that, 
though perhaps consistent with the epistemological assumptions of some 
academic fields, is inconsistent with the views of many religious 
                                                     
114. Id. at 93. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. See id.  
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believers.119 Some people would maintain that their religious faith is in 
fact driven by theology and ceremony, not by experience. And others 
would reject a clear distinction between the three. 
Caleb Mason has made an argument similar to Jackson’s. He argues 
that courts should accept the view of some philosophers that religious 
statements are nonsense because they are not subject to revision on the 
basis of empirical evidence.120 For this reason, Mason argues, courts 
cannot evaluate claims about religious truth, but may evaluate claims 
about non-religious truth (i.e., empirically evaluable claims) based on 
religious motivations.121 Regardless of the merit of Mason’s view of 
religious beliefs (many religious practitioners reject it),122 courts could 
not base their fact finding on his view without violating the no-
orthodoxy principle because they would be taking sides in a religious 
dispute. There is no vantage point on religion from which courts may 
avoid the no-orthodoxy principle. 
In the second place, Jackson argues that a nonbeliever is unlikely to 
empathize with foreign religious beliefs, and, therefore, is unlikely to 
trust the religious claimant. As a result, those with different religious 
beliefs should not evaluate a claimant’s sincerity. Yet Jackson had 
already confessed that he “can see in [the defendants’] teachings nothing 
but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth.”123 Somewhat ironically, 
then, he was able to perceive that his view of the plausibility of the 
defendants’ claims may have biased him against the defendants’ 
sincerity. Jackson thereby performed what he claimed to be so difficult. 
Jackson was over-claiming. Most people are likely to accept that 
others sincerely believe some things that they find to be implausible. 
Many hold religious beliefs that are implausible to others, and those who 
don’t hold such beliefs probably have friends or family members who 
do. Just as Jackson was able to do, most people will be able to 
distinguish between whether another’s beliefs are accurate and whether 
they are sincere. Furthermore, courts routinely instruct jurors to not 
allow their biases or personal beliefs about this or that to interfere with 
                                                     
119. See id.  
120. Mason, supra note 63, at 114; see also BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?, ch. 2 
(2013). 
121. Mason, supra note 63, at 114. 
122. Take, for instance, the claim that Jesus Christ has been raised from the dead, a 
quintessential example of a meaningless sentence under the standards of analytical philosophy. No 
less a practitioner than the Apostle Paul insisted that it was crucial to the Christian faith that Christ 
was actually—empirically—resurrected, 1 Cor. 15:12–20, and many Christians maintain that view, 
see generally N.T. WRIGHT, SURPRISED BY HOPE (2008). 
123. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92. 
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their evaluation of the evidence.124 There is no reason to think that bias 
about the plausibility of a religious claim is especially hard to put aside 
when one evaluates the claimant’s sincerity. 
3. The Believer’s Doubts 
Jackson’s final objection focuses on the claimant’s epistemology. He 
argues that “I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a 
religious representation amounts to actionable fraud.”125 Judge John 
Noonan finds this to be the “decisive[]” argument against adjudicating 
religious sincerity.126 
It is commonplace that doubt is often a component of religious belief. 
The standard for actionable fraud, the standard under which the Ballards 
were indicted, tried, and convicted, was knowing fraud.127 Knowledge is 
neither faith nor doubt—it is certainty. The Ballards were not convicted 
because, when they promised to heal people of their illness, they were in 
fact having a crisis of faith. They were convicted because the jury 
concluded that they knew for certain their claims were not true.128 The 
Ballards could have presented, and a court and jury would surely have 
considered, evidence to the effect that their beliefs, though sometimes 
tried and beset by doubt, disappointment, and struggle, had nevertheless 
been sincere. Most people can surely appreciate that such a faith may be 
genuine. 
Building on Jackson’s argument, Noonan develops a subtler one: 
what if the religious claimant believes that her claims are metaphorical, 
but allows her listeners to conclude that they are literal?129 What if the 
Ballards, by telling their followers they would heal them, sincerely 
believed that they could heal them spiritually, though not physically? 
Such a statement may be sincere though it implies that the speaker 
believes something she does not. What may distinguish sincerity from 
insincerity in this case is whether the speaker intended to deceive the 
hearer about her beliefs.130 
                                                     
124. See, e.g., infra section IV.B.2; see also Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81–82 (recounting the trial 
court’s commitment to restricting the jury from considering the plausibility or accuracy of the 
defendant’s religious statements). 
125. Id. at 93.  
126. NOONAN, supra note 93, at 718. 
127. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80 (“Each of the representations enumerated in the indictment was 
followed by the charge that respondents ‘well knew’ it was false.”). 
128. See id. 
129. NOONAN, supra note 93, at 722–23. 
130. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94, at 100–10 (discussing implicatures and equivocations). 
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This well-founded concern can be addressed by ordinary rules of 
evidence. The religious claimant could introduce evidence to the effect 
that she sincerely holds her beliefs as metaphors, but not as objective 
fact. Unless the fraud regulation requires full disclosure, the defendant 
could not be punished.131 Those who hold beliefs to be true 
metaphorically, rather than literally, know that they do. And even when 
they are unsure whether their beliefs are true literally, metaphorically, or 
neither, their state of mind—uncertainty—can be conveyed to others and 
is subject to evidentiary contestation. Adjudicating doubt or nuanced 
belief is in many ways no different from adjudicating mens rea: it is a 
question of degree. 
On the basis of the foregoing objections, Jackson concluded that 
courts should be “done with this business of judicially examining other 
peoples’ faiths.”132 Many scholars have either followed suit or 
determined that adjudicating religious sincerity is, at best, a necessary 
evil.133 Though the no-orthodoxy principle gives rise to these concerns, 
it does not require courts to decline to adjudicate religious sincerity. 
Furthermore, as the next Part argues, not adjudicating religious sincerity 
likewise poses its own dangers to religious liberty and equality. Part IV 
therefore explains that courts adjudicating sincerity should tweak the 
rules of evidence to account for Jackson’s objections under the no-
orthodoxy principle, rather than to abandon the task altogether. 
III. THE COSTS OF NOT ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS 
SINCERITY 
As scholars note, a court adjudicating religious sincerity risks 
unconsciously discounting the likelihood of sincerity based on its own 
appraisal of the belief’s plausibility, something the no-orthodoxy 
principle forbids.134 Perhaps, then, the government should abstain from 
adjudicating religious sincerity, whether in fraud or religious 
accommodation cases. Doing so, some suggest, is the only way to 
enforce the no-orthodoxy principle and to ensure the religious equality 
and liberty it was meant to protect. 
                                                     
131. A law requiring full disclosure, even if it required a believer to admit, against his religion, 
that his beliefs are purely metaphorical, does not violate the no-orthodoxy principle, for it does not 
require the government to weigh in on religious truth. It may, however, impermissibly burden 
religious exercise, depending on the relevant legal standard. Under Employment Division v. Smith, it 
probably wouldn’t. Under RFRA, it might. 
132. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95. 
133. See supra notes 17–20. 
134. See supra Part I. 
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This Part explores the dangers of ignoring religious sincerity. All of 
them stem from a presumption that religious insincerity happens—
religious hucksters have long been a staple of the American experience, 
and accommodation claimants sometimes gin up religiosity to justify an 
exemption.135 Ignoring insincere religious claims harms third parties, 
leads to doctrinal “suspicion creep,” and erodes support for religious 
liberty. The next Part argues that courts can adjudicate sincerity, 
avoiding these costs, without violating the no-orthodoxy principle. 
A. The Costs of Insincerity 
Common sense and experience suggest that insincerity about religion 
is no less frequent than insincerity about anything else—perhaps more 
so. In a nation that is religiously pluralistic and in some places deeply 
religious, exaggerations, if not outright fibs, about one’s religious beliefs 
are probably an important social lubricant.136 But like other forms of 
false speech, religious insincerity can sometimes harm others. When it 
does, the calculus of religious freedom flips. Conduct that was protected 
may be punished. A claim for removing a burden on phony religious 
exercise is nothing other than rent-seeking. 
Religious insincerity causes two kinds of harm to others: fraud, either 
on private parties or the government, and false accommodation claims, 
either against a private employer or the government. The persons 
harmed, and the gravity of that harm, depends on the context. Declining 
to adjudicate religious sincerity would ignore these harms, and could 
multiply them by inviting phony claims. 
1. Fraud 
This paper focuses on the adjudication of religious sincerity in the 
context of religious accommodation cases, but it is important to 
remember that a general principle against adjudicating religious sincerity 
would prohibit the government from prosecuting fraud—of any sort—
premised on religious insincerity. This is what John Oliver apparently 
                                                     
135. Of course, limiting religious accommodations by making the doctrine less generous would 
also alleviate some of these costs. For purposes of this Article, I take the current doctrine across the 
range of constitutional and statutory accommodations, federal and state, for granted. To the extent 
the law does extend religious accommodations, however, failing to enforce the sincerity 
requirement will come with the costs discussed in this Part. 
136. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94, at 117 (“[I]t can be a tiresome feature of villages, as John 
Stuart Mill observed, that everything is everyone’s business. Indeed, small traditional societies are 
typically full of lies, because it is so hard to keep anything secret.”). 
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believes the Constitution requires and what some scholars believe to be 
desirable. Any attempt to capture the cost of avoiding inquiries into 
religious sincerity must therefore consider the costs of religious fraud. 
The harm of a confidence game is obvious. A religious charlatan uses 
something that many people place beyond value to bilk them of money, 
time, and energy. Justice Jackson argued that the worst harm of religious 
fraud is the “mental and spiritual poison” it imparts to believers.137 He 
further implied that the Constitution puts all the harms of religious fraud 
beyond punishment.138 To the contrary: the First Amendment may 
require Americans to “put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of 
rubbish,”139 but it does not protect knowing falsehoods that harm others, 
and it never has.140 
2. Accommodation Claims 
The harms caused by false accommodation claims vary with the 
circumstance. For instance, employers often contest a religious 
accommodation plaintiff’s sincerity.141 When the employer chooses not 
to grant an accommodation, the employee sues the employer for 
discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate sincerity.142 
The costs of religious insincerity in the employment context depend 
on whether it is detected and litigated. If so, the costs are principally 
those associated with litigating the dispute.143 If not, and the employer 
                                                     
137. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95. 
138. Id. 
139. Id.  
140.  United States v. Alvarez, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–46 (2012) (discussing cases 
where the court held that the First Amendment does not protect knowing falsehoods that harm 
others). 
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to 
“discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . religion . . .”); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2016) 
(outlining the “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” elements of an employment 
religious discrimination claim); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); J. 
Gregory Grisham & Robbin W. Hutton, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: Current 
Trends Under Title VII, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 60, 60 (2014) (“[T]here 
has been an eighty-seven percent increase in the number of religious discrimination charges filed 
with the [EEOC] over the past ten years.”). 
142. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485–86 (5th Cir. 2014); Adeyeye v. Heartland 
Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 451–54 (7th Cir. 2013); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 
1438–39 (9th Cir. 1993). 
143. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 121 (2009); Laura Beth 
Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? 
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 175, 184–87 (2010). 
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provides an “accommodation,” the costs amount to the sum of litigation 
(if any) and the economic and social costs to the employer, other 
employees, and perhaps even to customers, of giving the claimant 
something of value to which the claimant was not entitled.144 
Prisoner accommodation cases also sometimes raise issues of 
religious sincerity.145 RLUIPA subjects state and federal prisoner 
religious accommodation claims to the compelling-interest test.146 The 
government has strong interests in prison uniformity, safety, and thrift, 
so it often has good reason to challenge religious accommodation 
requests on any ground available, including insincerity.147 And unlike a 
claim for an accommodation from a generally applicable law, the 
potential political cost to the government of challenging a prisoner’s 
religious sincerity approaches zero. 
The costs of insincere religious accommodation claims in the prison 
context are similar to those in the employee context, with a couple of 
wrinkles. First, the taxpayer is paying the tab for the litigation and the 
“accommodation” of a phony claim. Second, the “accommodation” may 
impose some unique burdens on others, including heightened danger or 
inconvenience for other inmates and prison officials.148 
The final category of claims that may call for an adjudication of 
religious sincerity arise when a claimant seeks an accommodation from a 
legal obligation that allegedly imposes a burden on the claimant’s 
religious exercise. A host of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory 
provisions either expressly provide for such an accommodation or have 
been interpreted to do so. Some of them provide an accommodation 
from a specific law or regulation, such as mandatory military service. 
Others, like RFRA, potentially apply to virtually any legal obligation. 
                                                     
144. Dallan F. Flake, Bearing Burdens: Religious Accommodations that Adversely Affect 
Coworker Morale, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 171, 175 (2015); Jennifer Fowler-Hermes & Luisette 
Gierbolini, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: The Devil Is in the Detail, 88 FLA. B.J. 34, 
35 (2014). 
145. For a thoughtful analysis of insincere prisoner religious accommodation claims, see Brady, 
supra note 11. 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to § 2000cc-5 (2012). 
147. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863–65 (2015) (citing the government’s 
compelling interest in prisons to reduce contraband or disguised identities); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (describing congressional intent for RLUIPA to be applied with “the 
urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions” in mind). 
148. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863–65 (addressing the risks of RLUIPA as it must be applied with 
deference to prison officials who must still maintain order, security, and discipline). A significant 
risk to safety would probably defeat the claim under the “compelling governmental interest” and 
“least restrictive means” elements of a prison accommodation claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012); 
see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723. 
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Although religious sincerity is a prerequisite for a successful religious 
accommodation claim outside of the prison context, the government 
rarely contests a claimant’s sincerity. This may be for several reasons. 
One may be the no-orthodoxy principle. The government may be 
concerned that delving into the claimant’s beliefs would violate the rule 
that the government may not adjudicate the accuracy of a claimant’s 
religious belief. Another reason may be that insincerity (like any mental 
state) is hard to prove; many cases may be resolved in the government’s 
favor on grounds that are easier to litigate. Yet another reason may be 
that the adjudication of sincerity is ordinarily a question of fact, and the 
vast majority of cases are resolved on questions of law before trial.149 A 
final reason is that the government could be wary of political fallout for 
questioning the sincerity of a claimant whose beliefs may resonate with 
an important political constituency. 
Given the costs associated with ignoring religious sincerity, the 
government should not hesitate to contest sincerity when it has reason to 
doubt the claimant’s credibility. As with prisoner accommodation 
claims, an “accommodation” for other false accommodation claims may 
impose costs on third parties.150 Religious accommodations, like all 
governmental distributions of rights, entail a trade-off of public goods. 
Religious freedom and equality is exchanged for administrative 
complication, financial costs, and, in some cases, increased burdens on 
others.151 Accommodating a conscientious objector to war, for instance, 
shifts the burden of serving in the armed forces to another draftee. When 
the claim is insincere, an accommodation generates public costs and 
                                                     
149. See generally infra section IV.B. 
150. At some point a religious accommodation may impose so many costs on third parties that it 
violates the Establishment Clause. See generally Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 
(1985). The degree to which a religious accommodation may burden third parties consistent with the 
Establishment Clause is a matter of academic dispute. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, 
Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39 (2014); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 
(2014). The Court has consistently upheld statutes that accommodate religious exercise, even at 
another’s expense, so long as the accommodation is not absolute and the government has an 
alternative way to alleviate the burdens imposed on third parties. See Brief of Constitutional Law 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, Et Al., Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354, 356). 
151. For one account of how to determine whether an accommodation under a general 
accommodation law such as RFRA imposes a burden on third parties, see generally Nelson Tebbe, 
Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, 
in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND 
EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfield eds., forthcoming 2018) (on file with the 
author). 
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shifts private burdens without protecting religious liberty and equality. 
Furthermore, as the next two sections suggest, permitting insincere 
claims may indirectly harm religious liberty. 
B. Doctrinal Implications 
Abstaining from determining a claimant’s sincerity also has negative 
effects on religious accommodation doctrine. First, a court’s 
unaddressed suspicion about the claimant’s sincerity may result in 
“suspicion creep.” The court’s suspicion may affect its analysis of 
whether the claimant’s beliefs are “religious,” and, if so, whether the 
government’s regulation places a “substantial burden” on the claimant’s 
religious exercise. Suspicion creep not only affects the analysis of the 
claim before the court; it also can contort the doctrinal analysis for future 
claimants whose claims are undoubtedly sincere. 
Second, when courts are reticent to adjudicate religious sincerity, 
insincere claims appear to be a bigger problem than they really are. The 
government’s “interest” in avoiding insincere claims is more 
“compelling” because there appears to be no way to stop them. An 
accommodation in one case could be a floodgate for insincere claims. 
The government has a “compelling interest” in preventing such a flood, 
and therefore a “compelling interest” in rejecting an accommodation for 
an admittedly sincere claimant. 
1. “Suspicion Creep” 
Ignoring religious sincerity can lead to suspicion creep. Suppose a 
court suspects a claimant is insincere. Suspicion creep occurs when a 
court’s suspicion improperly influences its analysis of other doctrinal 
components of the claim. 
Religious accommodation claimants must ordinarily establish that the 
government’s regulation places a “substantial burden” on their “religious 
exercise.”152 To establish these elements, a claimant must show that the 
beliefs are (1) sincere, (2) religious, and (3) substantially burdened.153 
                                                     
152. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 427–30 
(2006); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb-4 (2012); Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–cc-5 (2012); Angela C. Carmella, 
State Constitutional Protections of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 
1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (discussing these elements in state constitutional law); Andy G. Olree, The 
Continuing Threshold Test for Free Exercise Claims, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103 (2008) 
(arguing that the prima facie case for claims under the Free Exercise Clause, including the sincerity 
requirement, survived Smith). 
153. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015); Oklevueha Native Am. 
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The government must then show that the regulation is the “least 
restrictive means” of achieving a “compelling governmental interest.”154 
Since claimants bear the burden of showing that their beliefs are 
religious and substantially burdened, these are the components of a 
religious accommodation claim most likely to suffer the effects of 
suspicion creep. 
Consider a recent case. A prisoner alleged that he believes the Flying 
Spaghetti Monster is responsible for gravity (by pushing everything 
down with its invisible glutinous appendages), and he seeks an 
accommodation from prison regulations so that he can celebrate 
“FSMism” by eating large bowls of pasta and wearing pirate garb.155 
Suppose that the claim goes to a bench trial. Suppose further that the 
judge (wrongly) believes that the no-orthodoxy principle prohibits the 
adjudication of a claimant’s religious sincerity. But the judge cannot 
shake the suspicion that the claimant does not really believe in the 
Flying Spaghetti Monster. Were the judge to allow that suspicion to 
influence, sub silentio, the analysis of another element of the 
accommodation analysis, such as whether FSMism is really a “religion,” 
or whether the prison regulations imposed a “substantial burden” on the 
claimant’s “religious exercise,” the result would be suspicion creep.156 
The ills of suspicion creep are at least twofold. At a minimum, a court 
is issuing a judgment without giving the full reasons for it. The point of 
written opinions is to demonstrate that the court is engaged in legal 
reasoning and attempting to follow the law. A judgment based on secret 
reasons undermines the rule of law. But judges probably routinely issue 
judgments based in part on unstated—and indeed subconscious—
reasons. A more important concern, perhaps, is that suspicion creep can 
have the unintended effect of perverting a court’s articulation of the 
requirements for a religious accommodation claim, making it harder for 
sincere claimants in future cases to state a claim. 
Unsurprisingly, suspicion creep is hard to demonstrate. A judge is 
unlikely to say he is ruling against a claimant on grounds other than 
                                                     
Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2016). 
154. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.  § 2000bb-1 (2012); Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §  2000cc (2012); Religious Freedom Protected, TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.003 (West 2011). 
155. See Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 823–26 (D. Neb. 2016). 
156. For a possible example of this, see Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1364 
(11th Cir. 2009) (Edenfield, J., dissenting) (“[i]n this case, although the Immigration Judge never 
directly addressed the issue of credibility, she commented throughout her order on the numerous 
questionable aspects of Kazemzadeh’s conversion” and ultimately concluded that he did not have a 
well-founded fear of religious persecution in Iran). 
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sincerity because the judge suspects the claimant is insincere. And, of 
course, religious insincerity rarely operates in a vacuum. A judgment 
against an insincere religious accommodation claim, for instance, is 
over-determined. Without sincerity, there is no “religious exercise” and 
therefore no “substantial burden” on it.157 
So how do we know that suspicion creep happens? Perhaps the best 
answer, though the least susceptible to proof, is common sense. A 
number of criminal defendants charged with illegal possession of 
marijuana have claimed a religious accommodation. For every case in 
which a court has expressly questioned the defendant’s religious 
sincerity,158 there is another in which the court squeezed reasonable 
suspicion about the claimant’s sincerity into its analysis of another 
doctrinal question. One district judge, for instance, noted that “[t]he 
Court has given [defendant] the benefit of the doubt by not scrutinizing 
the sincerity of his beliefs . . . . even though it suspects [the defendant] is 
astute enough to know that by calling his beliefs ‘religious,’ the First 
Amendment or RFRA might immunize him from prosecution.”159 
In other cases, a court’s rhetoric and analysis may suggest suspicion. 
In one of the recent contraception mandate cases, for instance, Judge 
Posner seemed to question whether the University of Notre Dame really 
held the beliefs that motivated its accommodation claim.160 Notre Dame 
had argued that its religion forbade it from doing two things that the 
regulation required: executing the paperwork that would legally 
authorize and/or obligate its insurance providers to provide 
contraception coverage; and maintaining a contractual relationship with 
a provider that provided such coverage.161 The government did not 
contest Notre Dame’s sincerity, so the court was bound to accept it. 
                                                     
157. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 824 (suggesting that “the deliberate absurdity of 
[FSMism’s] provisions would undermine” prisoner’s argument for a religious accommodation). 
158. See United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kuch, 288 
F. Supp. 439, 444–45 (D.D.C. 1968) (“In short, the ‘Catechism and Handbook’ is full of goofy 
nonsense, contradictions, and irreverent expressions. There is a conscious effort to assert in passing 
the attributes of religion but obviously only for tactical purposes.”); Lineker v. State, No. A-8957, 
2010 WL 200014 (Alaska Ct. App., Jan. 20, 2010) (upholding trial court determination that 
claimant lacked a sincere religious belief for possessing marijuana). 
159. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1509 (D. Wyo. 1995) (“The Court notes that 
Meyers’ professed beliefs have an ad hoc quality that neatly justify his desire to smoke 
marijuana.”); see also Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc., v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (holding, under similar circumstances, that a prohibition on marijuana use does not 
“substantially burden” claimant’s asserted beliefs because the claimant’s religion does not require 
marijuana use). 
160. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015). 
161. See Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d 606 
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Nevertheless, Posner repeatedly framed Notre Dame’s allegations 
about its religious beliefs in a way that suggested he was suspicious: 
“[b]ecause of its contractual relations with the two [insurance 
providers] . . . Notre Dame claims to be complicit in the sin of 
contraception[;]”162 “Notre Dame tells us that it likewise objects to 
[another regulatory] alternative.”163 The more appropriate way to put it, 
given the procedural context, was that “Notre Dame [believes it is] 
complicit” and “Notre Dame likewise objects to that alternative.” 
Posner’s qualifiers suggest suspicion. 
Furthermore, Posner emphasized a number of facts about the case that 
may have been relevant to determining Notre Dame’s sincerity, but, 
assuming its sincerity, had no bearing on whether the regulations created 
a “substantial burden” on its religious exercise. He recalled that Notre 
Dame’s prior conduct had been somewhat inconsistent with its religious 
beliefs,164 emphasized repeatedly that he did not understand how Notre 
Dame’s proposed regulatory solution would avoid complicity with sin,165 
and contrasted Notre Dame’s religious objection with the objections of 
other nonprofits that accepted the government’s accommodation.166 All 
of these may be relevant to assessing Notre Dame’s sincerity, but once it 
was established (or assumed as a matter of law) that Notre Dame 
sincerely believed that its religion forbade it from the conduct required 
by the government, these facts were irrelevant to whether the regulatory 
scheme substantially burdened that religious exercise.167 Ultimately, it 
seems likely that Posner raised these points because he believed that 
                                                     
(No. 13–3853). 
162. Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 611 (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 618 (emphasis added). 
164. Id. at 611 (Notre Dame signed Form 700 to avoid liability); see also id. at 610 (“When the 
accommodation was promulgated in July of 2013, Notre Dame did not at first bring a new 
suit . . . . Not until December 2013 did the university file the present suit, challenging the 
accommodation. The delay in suing was awkward, since the regulations were to take effect . . . on 
January 1, 2014.”); id. (“The next day—the last day before it would be penalized for violating the 
regulations—the university signed EBSA Form 700 and thereby opted out of providing 
contraceptive coverage for its employees . . . . Later it signed the same form regarding Aetna.”). 
165. Id. at 612 (“It’s difficult to see how that would make the health plan any less of a ‘conduit’ 
between Notre Dame and Aetna/Meritain.”); see also id. at 617 (“Nor does Notre Dame explain 
how a government program that directly or indirectly provided contraception coverage to Notre 
Dame employees—as Notre Dame suggests—would avoid complicity in sin.”). 
166. Id. at 618 (“Notre Dame tells us that it likewise objects to that alternative. . . . the 
accommodation sought and received by Wheaton College.”). 
167. Posner was correct that “the courts cannot substitute even the most sincere religious beliefs 
for legal analysis” of whether the government was imposing a “substantial burden” under the 
statute. See id. at 622; infra section V.B. 
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Notre Dame was insincere, something he did not say directly, or because 
he believed that their religious beliefs—especially their beliefs about 
complicity—were implausible, something the no-orthodoxy principle 
puts outside the courts’ authority.168 
It is impossible to tell whether the court’s suspicion (or perhaps its 
view that Notre Dame’s religious beliefs were implausible) affected its 
doctrinal analysis. Because the court of appeals was only called upon to 
determine whether the district court had abused its discretion by 
declining to issue a preliminary injunction in the case, it did not have 
occasion to conclusively determine the legal issues. Judge Posner’s 
rhetoric and analysis suggest, however, that he believed Notre Dame was 
not entirely forthcoming. Given that the government did not contest 
Notre Dame’s sincerity, he should have consciously set aside his 
suspicion, rather than slipping it rhetorically into his analysis of the other 
elements of the claim. 
Despite occasional examples of overt suspicion creep, and more 
frequent examples of tacit suspicion creep, there are probably more 
cases where the court’s suspicion influences its legal analysis sub 
silentio. This form of suspicion creep is the most troubling, for it fails to 
signal to other courts the role that suspicion played in the analysis. This 
risks systemic doctrinal effects that disadvantage other religious 
accommodation claimants. 
Suspicion creep is entirely understandable. Evidence of religious 
insincerity is relevant to a religious accommodation claim. Lawyers have 
long known that factfinders have a difficult time ignoring relevant 
evidence, even when rules of evidence place it out-of-bounds. This is 
why courts routinely decide evidentiary disputes without the jury 
present, to prevent evidence that is relevant, but prejudicial, from 
influencing the jury. In this respect, suspicion creep is no different from 
the effects of attempting to suppress any relevant evidence. A court that 
does not directly consider sincerity is nevertheless likely to be 
influenced by evidence of insincerity. 
The procedural rules, too, contribute to suspicion creep. Because 
sincerity is a question of fact, not of law, courts are unlikely to resolve a 
case on sincerity before trial. On a motion to dismiss, the court will 
presume that the claimant’s alleged religious sincerity is true.169 On a 
motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, the court will 
                                                     
168. See Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 628 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (“Yet the majority here 
sides with HHS, and ‘in effect tell[s] the plaintiff[] that [its] beliefs are flawed.’” (quoting Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014))). 
169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
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construe the evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s sincerity.170 The vast 
majority of cases are decided before trial, with a judgment on the 
pleadings or summary judgment.171 Moreover, the government often (but 
not always) concedes a claimant’s sincerity. The result is that trial courts 
rarely have an occasion to directly address the claimant’s sincerity, even 
when the pleadings or evidence give rise to a suspicion of insincerity. 
Appellate courts, in turn, usually restrict themselves to reviewing the 
trial court’s decisions; when the trial court made no decision about the 
claimant’s sincerity, the appellate court has no occasion to review it. 
Even when a court has determined that a religious accommodation 
claimant has carried the burden of showing religious sincerity by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the court may still have some doubt 
about it. A fifty-one percent chance of sincerity is sufficient to satisfy 
the legal standard, but it is unlikely to keep a court from allowing the 
forty-nine percent chance of insincerity to influence its legal analysis. 
All of these practicalities of adjudication help to explain why suspicion 
creep occurs, but they do not justify it. In fact, suspicion creep may be 
especially unfair when a litigant has not been obligated to establish 
sincerity because the opponent did not contest it or because the court 
decided the case on the pleadings (or both). 
Avoiding concerns about insincerity does not make the issue go away; 
it transforms it, submerges it, and raises rule-of-law problems.172 As the 
next two Parts of this Article explain, when courts confront suspicious 
religious claims, they should either address them head-on in a manner 
consistent with the no-orthodoxy principle, or self-consciously avoid 
allowing those suspicions to affect their legal analysis of whether the 
claimant’s exercise is “religious” and whether the government regulation 
“substantially burdens” it. Both of these are legal questions for the court 
to determine, quite apart from the factual question about whether the 
claimant sincerely believes what he or she claims to believe. 
2. A Flood of Insincere Claims 
Systematically ignoring religious sincerity out of a concern that 
adjudicating it would run afoul of the no-orthodoxy principle can also 
                                                     
170. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
171. See VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT ch. 1 (2007). 
172. See Brady, supra note 11, at 1450 (“It is troubling that courts might be relying on 
unexpressed sincerity tests . . . . If sincerity is the determinative issue in RFRA and RLUIPA cases, 
courts should address the issue openly—not through implicit and imperfect proxies.”). 
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limit religious liberty by giving the government a good reason to deny 
religious accommodations: the risk of insincere claims. 
Once a claimant has established that a government regulation places a 
substantial burden on her sincere religious exercise, the government 
must show that the regulation is the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing a compelling government interest. One way for the 
government to meet this burden is to show that there would be so many 
legitimate demands for a religious accommodation that those 
accommodations would completely undermine the regulation.173 This 
concern is entirely legitimate. Sometimes, however, a court will go 
further—it will consider the costs of insincere claims that might result 
from granting an accommodation for a sincere one. 
Consider United States v. Adeyemo.174 The government indicted the 
defendant for importing leopard skins without a permit and without 
declaring them.175 The defendant asserted a defense to prosecution under 
RFRA.176 According to the defendant, the non-importation law 
substantially burdened his use of leopard skins in the exercise of his 
Santeria religious beliefs.177 The government issues permits for 
importing leopard skins, but not for religious reasons.178 The court 
determined that the government had carried its burden of showing that 
religious accommodations from the non-importation law would 
undermine its compelling interest in protecting leopards.179 The court 
listed several reasons. One of them was that there are enough Santerians 
in the United States who might want leopard skins that issuing permits 
on religious grounds would lead to the eradication of the species.180 This 
may be an entirely legitimate concern. It goes to the heart of the 
government’s compelling interest in not allowing a particular religious 
accommodation.181 
                                                     
173. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying a Free Exercise 
accommodation from social security taxes partly on the ground that the government had a high 
interest in avoiding a flood of indistinguishable religious accommodation claims that would 
undermine the federal tax system). 
174. 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
175. Id. at 1091–92. 
176. Id. at 1084. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1085. 
179. Id. at 1089–90. 
180. Id.  
181. Id. at 1091–92 (stating the government must have compelling interest in not allowing this 
accommodation of not allowing a religious exception to importing leopard skins, as opposed to a 
compelling interest in general). 
06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:07 AM 
1222 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1185 
 
The court went on, however, to agree with the government that 
allowing sincere religious accommodations would also encourage phony 
claims, which would be difficult to administer and may further decimate 
the species.182 An accommodation may give rise to insincere claims, but 
the challenge of restricting insincere claims should not counsel against 
an accommodation for sincere ones.183 As explained in Part IV, the 
government can sort out insincere claims. A speculative risk of false 
claimants and the administrative costs of outing them should not defeat a 
sincere claim unless, perhaps, “actual experience proved [false claims] 
to be a substantial obstacle” to the government’s compelling interests.184 
C. Distrusting Religious Liberty 
Ignoring religious sincerity may have another important cost. When 
the government gives a pass to those who insincerely claim the benefits 
of religious liberty, it erodes the value of that liberty in the eyes of the 
public. 
What could be a more powerful illustration of this phenomenon than 
the John Oliver sketch discussed at the beginning of this Article? Oliver 
sought to parody religious fraudsters precisely to illustrate that U.S. 
religious liberty law is too lax. In a sense, he ridiculed not only scam 
artists, but  religious liberty itself. Perhaps Oliver’s misperception of the 
sincerity requirement is widely shared. But the misperception that 
religious liberty entails the protection of phony religious claims 
undermines public support for the protection of sincere ones. Such a 
conclusion by the public is only sensible: if “religious liberty” inoculates 
fraudulent claims, perhaps we should rethink it. Eroding support for 
religious liberty altogether is a high price to pay simply because it is 
believed that courts cannot be trusted to weed out insincere claims. 
As the next Part explains, all of the foregoing costs that arise from 
ignoring religious sincerity—to others, to doctrine, and to religious 
liberty itself—are avoidable. Courts may adjudicate religious sincerity 
without running afoul of the Constitution’s no-orthodoxy principle. 
                                                     
182. Id. at 1092. 
183. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 14, at 53. 
184. Giannella, supra note 14, at 1416; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) 
(“[I]t is highly doubtful whether such evidence [of the possibility of fraudulent claims] would be 
sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties.”); Pepper, supra note 21, at 
328. 
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IV. THREADING THE NEEDLE 
Courts lack clear direction about the nuts and bolts of adjudicating 
religious sincerity.185 This Part explains how courts may adjudicate 
religious sincerity without violating the no-orthodoxy principle. They 
should evaluate religious sincerity just as they would any other mental 
state, with one important caveat: they should avoid inferring insincerity 
from implausibility. Otherwise, courts should adjudicate religious 
sincerity subject to the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence, and 
should carefully weigh evidence of ulterior motive, personal 
inconsistency, and idiosyncrasy. 
A. Burden of Proof 
A religious accommodation claimant usually bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her religious exercise is 
based on a sincere religious belief. To avoid running afoul of the no-
orthodoxy principle, some scholars suggest that courts should raise the 
burden of proof186 and shift it to the opponent.187 This would be a major 
exception to the rules of procedure and evidence, one the Constitution 
simply does not require.188 
A religious accommodation claimant must usually show sincerity by a 
preponderance of the evidence.189 Sincerity is a question of fact.190 As a 
practical matter, the burden on the plaintiff depends on the motion 
                                                     
185. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 204 (“The feasibility of a judicially enforceable right of 
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause will depend on formulating a workable, fair, and properly 
limited approach to sincerity questions.”); Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 65 (“Even when 
weighing the sincerity of individual religious beliefs, ‘[c]ourts are often unclear about which party 
bears the burden of proof and what evidence is permissible.’”); Brady, supra note 11, at 1433 
(“[C]ourts have not developed a formal sincerity test in RFRA and RLUIPA cases.”). 
186. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 282 (arguing that “courts should look for a clear and 
unmistakable discrepancy between the believer’s claims and their [sic] behavior before concluding 
that their [sic] claims are insincere”). 
187. See id. at 283 (“A heightened evidentiary requirement also reduces the risk of 
discriminatory decision making more broadly.”); Brady, supra note 11, at 1455–56. 
188. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 21, at 328. 
189. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“In addition to showing that 
the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief, petitioner also bore 
the burden of proving that the Department’s grooming policy substantially burdened that exercise of 
religion.”). One exception is the bankruptcy code, which essentially creates a presumption of 
sincerity for a pre-bankruptcy charitable transfer that is less than fifteen percent of income, or 
“consistent with the practices of the debtor in making charitable contributions.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(2) (2012).  
190. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:07 AM 
1224 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1185 
 
before the court and whether the opponent has contested sincerity.191 On 
a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true 
and determines whether the plaintiff’s claim can be dismissed solely on 
legal grounds.192 The court does not adjudicate the plaintiff’s sincerity. 
On a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court construes the 
evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether there 
is a genuine issue of material fact worthy of going to trial.193 Unless the 
defendant has presented evidence of insincerity and the plaintiff has 
failed to present any credible evidence of sincerity, the court will likely 
not enter summary judgment on that ground.194 If the opponent never 
contests sincerity, then the claimant, having put some evidence of 
sincerity into the record, has established it as a matter of law (regardless 
the stage of litigation). As a practical matter, therefore, before trial, the 
rules of procedure ordinarily favor a claimant’s allegations of sincerity 
and presentation of some evidence of sincerity.195 
Some scholars have argued that the burden should shift in 
accommodation cases, requiring the opponent to establish that the 
claimant is insincere.196 Some have also suggested that the standard of 
proof ought to be higher than normal. Professor Kathleen Brady, for 
instance, argues that “courts should look for clear and unmistakable 
discrepancy between the believer’s claims and their behavior before 
concluding that their claims are insincere.”197 According to Brady, “[a] 
heightened evidentiary requirement . . . reduces the risk of 
discriminatory decision making . . . . A narrowly tailored inquiry with a 
demanding standard of proof leaves less room for judges to equate 
                                                     
191. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428–30 
(2006) (discussing the pretrial burdens of proof under RFRA). 
192. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
193. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
194. EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P. R., 
279 F.3d 49, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2002); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352–53 (10th 
Cir. 1997). 
195. The pretrial procedure does not change the claimant’s burden when the claimant moves for 
judgment before trial or at trial. The plaintiff must still establish sincerity by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
196. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 282 (arguing that courts should require “clear and 
unmistakable evidence of insincerity,” which means that the burden is on the opponent to present 
such evidence). But see Riga, supra note 21, at 260 (“[S]ince Free Exercise claims are proper to the 
individual alone, it is fair and equitable to place the burden of sincerity upon him and not upon the 
government.”). 
197. BRADY, supra note 20, at 282. 
06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:07 AM 
2017] ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS SINCERITY 1225 
 
assertions that they view as kooky or implausible with claims that are 
insincere.”198 
Brady’s constitutional concern is well placed, but her proposed 
remedy is unnecessary. The most precise way to prevent courts from 
violating the no-orthodoxy principle is to prohibit them from inferring 
insincerity from implausibility. Although constitutional and common 
law doctrines occasionally overprotect constitutional rights, courts 
should also take the costs of overprotection into account. In this case, 
requiring the opponent to prove insincerity would be inconsistent with 
an array of statutory regimes. It would also make it harder to weed out 
and thereby reduce the costs of insincere claims. An approach more 
tailored to the contours of the no-orthodoxy principle would neutralize 
Brady’s concerns without violating the Constitution. 
B. The Caveat: No Inferring Insincerity from Inaccuracy 
Although the Supreme Court has stated that “any fact which casts 
doubt on the veracity of the [selective service] registrant is relevant,”199 
as discussed in Part II above, the no-orthodoxy principle demands an 
important caveat. Courts may not evaluate the “truth” of one’s religious 
claims. In determining religious sincerity, what this means is that courts 
may neither determine as a factual matter that a religious claim is 
inaccurate, nor infer from a claim’s apparent inaccuracy or 
implausibility that the claimant is insincere. This section provides a 
conceptual distinction between accuracy and sincerity, explains that 
courts and factfinders routinely distinguish between these concepts, and 
shows briefly how courts can protect against inferring insincerity from 
inaccuracy, steering clear of the no-orthodoxy principle. 
1. Distinguishing Accuracy and Sincerity 
Whether a religious belief is accurate is different from whether it is 
sincerely held. Accuracy and sincerity are both aspects of what 
philosopher Bernard Williams has called “truthfulness”—they overlap, 
but they are distinct.200 Accuracy describes the correspondence between 
a statement (or a belief) and the object of that statement or belief. The 
accuracy of a statement is subject to empirical study. Whether a 
statement is in fact accurate is different from whether the speaker 
                                                     
198. Id. at 283. 
199. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955) (emphasis added). 
200. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94. 
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actually believes what she asserts or claims to believe, i.e., whether the 
speaker is sincere. To oversimplify, perhaps, accuracy depends on the 
statement’s correspondence to observable reality external to the speaker. 
Sincerity depends on the statement’s correspondence to the speaker’s 
subjective belief. 
Both are crucial aspects of truthfulness, and the habits and abilities 
that help one become more adept at speaking accurately overlap with 
those that help one to become more adept at speaking sincerely. But the 
accuracy of a statement and the speaker’s sincerity are nonetheless 
distinguishable. Suppose a speaker says, “that car is blue.” The speaker 
is colorblind; the car is green. The speaker believes that the statement is 
accurate. The speaker is sincere, but the statement is inaccurate. 
Suppose again that the colorblind speaker says, “the car is blue.” And 
the car is blue. But this time the speaker believes it is green. He only 
said the car was blue to tease his young niece who is trying to learn her 
colors. (Admittedly a game to which the colorblind are not well suited.) 
Here we have the inverse of the prior hypothetical. The speaker is 
insincere (he believes the car is green) but the statement is nonetheless 
accurate (the car actually is blue). 
This all seems fairly straightforward as applied to the color of a car. It 
gets somewhat more complicated as applied to religious beliefs, for an 
accommodation claim ordinarily entails beliefs not only about religion, 
but also about religious morality. A claimant could be inaccurate or 
insincere, or both, about either one. Under the no-orthodoxy principle, 
the government may not adjudicate the accuracy of the claimant’s 
religious views, or the accuracy of the claimant’s religious beliefs, 
whether they are about religious doctrine or religiously influenced 
morality. It may, though, adjudicate the claimant’s sincerity as to either. 
Consider the following example. A prisoner claims that his religion 
forbids him from cutting his beard, so he is entitled to an 
accommodation from the prison’s no-beard policy. Here, there are two 
levels of potential inaccuracy. Most broadly, the claimant’s religion may 
inaccurately describe God and God’s commands. For instance, suppose 
the religion is theistic and, in fact, there is no God. Or the religion may 
be a variant of Christianity and in fact, perhaps, Jesus Christ was not in 
any way divine. And so on. It seems fairly settled and noncontroversial 
that the government may not determine that the claimant’s religion, or 
any of its theological claims, is inaccurate. Nor, as I have suggested, 
may the government infer that the claimant is insincere simply because 
his claimed belief is either inaccurate or implausible. 
Another possible inaccuracy arises, however. What if the claimant is 
simply inaccurate about whether his religion actually forbids him from 
06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:07 AM 
2017] ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS SINCERITY 1227 
 
shaving his beard? Maybe he sincerely believes it does, but he is simply 
wrong. No one else who shares his religious beliefs agrees with him. 
And there appears to be no ordinary logic that would lead someone to 
conclude, based on whatever authorities dictate his religious morality, 
that the religion forbids an adherent from shaving. Suppose the reason 
this particular adherent believes his religion forbids beard-shaving is 
because its holy texts forbid touching another person’s hair trimmings, 
and from this prohibition the adherent has determined that he cannot 
make it easier for someone else to violate this prohibition by shaving his 
beard and sending the trimmings on their merry way. 
All of this—the clear prohibition, the adherent’s reasoning, and the 
adherent’s conscientious conclusion—are likewise questions of religious 
accuracy, beyond a court’s ken. Whether the belief accurately reflects 
the best understanding of the religion would require the government to 
determine the best understanding of that religion, something the no-
orthodoxy principle flatly prohibits. So too with whether the claimant’s 
moral reasoning, or conscientious judgment on the basis of that 
reasoning, reflects either the community’s beliefs or an accurate mode of 
moral reasoning. Some may find it unfortunate, from a theological, 
social, or cultural perspective, that the no-orthodoxy principle tolerates 
religious atomism. But it does. With respect to religious accuracy—
including accuracy about what the claimant’s religion requires—each 
person is an island.201 
None of this, however, means that the government may not question 
whether the claimant sincerely believes that his religion forbids him 
from shaving his beard. And if the claimant cannot demonstrate that he 
sincerely believes this, the law does not require the government to 
permit an accommodation. 
Much of the above is fairly well established in law, even though the 
Supreme Court justices sometimes appear to be confused about it. I have 
merely suggested a subtle change in language that should help to clarify 
the concepts. The government may adjudicate religious sincerity, but not 
religious accuracy or plausibility, understood as the likelihood that a 
belief or statement is accurate. My proposed contribution is simple: in 
the course of adjudicating religious sincerity, the government should 
avoid inferring insincerity from evidence of inaccuracy or implausibility. 
This notion is not entirely new,202 but the forgoing distinction between 
sincerity and accuracy should make it clearer. 
                                                     
201. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981). 
202. Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 64 (“Provided that courts take care that their test for 
sincerity is truly one for fraud, not verity or centrality, placing this limit on RFRA claims will best 
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2. Sincerity and Accuracy in Law 
The distinction between sincerity and accuracy is not otherwise 
foreign to American law. Substantive law often distinguishes between 
sincerity and accuracy. Criminal law,203 tort,204 securities regulation,205 
and professional responsibility rules,206 for instance, all distinguish 
between negligent misrepresentation (inaccuracy) and knowing fraud 
(inaccuracy and insincerity). In general, evidence that the speaker was 
aware that his statements were false increases the punishment or 
liability, so litigants and courts often have reason to carefully distinguish 
between inaccuracy and insincerity.207 
Routine trial practice, too, requires judges and juries to distinguish 
between accuracy and sincerity. One thing that sets the common law 
system apart is the reliance on witness testimony rather than written 
answers to interrogatories.208 One of the justifications for this difference 
is the belief that the probative value of testimony depends in part on the 
speaker’s credibility, which is easier to judge in person through the real-
time adversarial process.209 Factfinders facing inconsistent testimony 
thus have to distinguish not only between the accuracy of the respective 
witnesses, but their sincerity.210 To be sure, witnesses can sincerely 
disagree, leaving nothing for the factfinder to do but to determine, based 
                                                     
effectuate Congress’s intent.”); McConnell, supra note 14, at 37 (noting that “the government can 
adopt screening devices designed to separate faith from fraud” “so long as the government confines 
its inquiry to the sincerity—as distinguished from the truth—of the individual’s professed beliefs”); 
see also EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 106 (“The sincerity approach [under Canadian constitutional 
law] takes seriously the problems of authenticity by establishing the authenticity of a practice on the 
basis of evidence that can be reliably assessed but which steers clear of contentious considerations 
of doctrinal requirements of a religion.”). 
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (providing a gradient of measuring a 
defendant’s culpability ranging from “purposely” to “negligently”). 
204. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining 
negligent misrepresentation), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(defining fraudulent misrepresentation requiring intent). 
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (making it unlawful to commit fraud in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (stating “scienter is an 
element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”). 
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (noting “fraud” requires 
a purpose or intent to deceive). 
207. See supra notes 203–06. 
208. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373–74 (1768). 
209. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 246 (2003). 
210. See, e.g., Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[A]ssessing a claimant’s 
sincerity of [religious] belief demands a full exposition of facts and the opportunity for the 
factfinder to observe the claimant’s demeanor during direct and cross-examination.”). 
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on other evidence, which account is more accurate. But often factfinders 
discount the testimony of witnesses they perceive to be insincere. So the 
conceptual compartmentalization of accuracy and sincerity, though 
perhaps unusual in ordinary life, is typical in law. The constitutional rule 
prohibiting courts from adjudicating the accuracy of religious claims but 
permitting the adjudication of religious sincerity is an outlier for 
prohibiting the one but not the other, but not for distinguishing between 
them. 
3. Limiting the Factfinder’s Use of Evidence of Inaccuracy 
A number of scholars have urged that prohibiting the adjudication of 
religious accuracy is not enough—courts should also avoid adjudicating 
religious sincerity whenever possible. The reason is that evidence of 
plausibility is ordinarily probative of sincerity. The more implausible a 
factfinder believes the religious belief to be, the harder it will be for the 
factfinder to conclude that the claimant actually believes it. 
The remedy is too much. Courts should admit all evidence probative 
of sincerity, other than evidence of religious inaccuracy or 
implausibility. If the factfinder is a jury, an instruction to the effect that 
the jury should not base its view of the claimant’s sincerity on its own 
view of the plausibility of the beliefs should suffice. The rules of 
evidence allow courts to admit evidence to show one thing but not 
another, and judges give limiting instructions all the time.211 In fact, the 
trial court’s proposed jury instructions in Ballard were not all that 
bad.212 
Professor William Marshall has noted “at least some tension” 
between this reading of Ballard and Employment Division v. Smith.213 In 
                                                     
211. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (stating the court must restrict evidence if it is admissible for one 
purpose but not another). 
212. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1944) (“As far as this Court sees the 
issue, it is immaterial what these defendants preached or wrote or taught in their classes. They are 
not going to be permitted to speculate on the actuality of the happening of those incidents. Now, I 
think I have made that as clear as I can. Therefore, the religious beliefs of these defendants cannot 
be an issue in this court. The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those 
things? If they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that.”). Judge Noonan 
suggests that Ballard effectively prohibits a claimant from testifying that his religious beliefs are 
accurate. See Noonan, supra note 18, at 718. I don’t believe Ballard requires this result. Ballard 
prohibits prosecution for inaccurate or implausible religious claims. I see no reason why a party 
could not testify about the content of his belief—indeed, he may have to do so to establish sincerity. 
And of course a sincere claimant will believe that his claims are accurate. What neither the claimant 
nor the opponent may do is attempt to establish the accuracy of the claims (a factual judgment ruled 
out by the no-orthodoxy principle) to show the claims are sincere. 
213. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry 
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Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an 
accommodation from a neutral and generally applicable law.214 
Exempting claimants (and fraud defendants) from neutral and generally 
applicable rules of evidence—like the rule that one may infer insincerity 
from evidence of implausibility—seems to be inconsistent with Smith.215 
As Marshall notes, though, the Ballard rule is distinguishable from 
Smith because it seeks to promote additional concerns about 
“government prosecution of unpopular religious beliefs” and the 
government’s incompetence “to decide religious issues.”216 I would go 
further. As in Hosanna-Tabor,217 the Ballard rule does not conflict with 
Smith because it arises not only from the Free Exercise Clause, but also 
from the Establishment Clause. Both clauses (and others besides) lend 
their weight and rationale to the no-orthodoxy principle, of which the 
Ballard rule is one instantiation. 
Finally, some object to putting a claimant’s sincerity to a jury on the 
ground that a jury is more likely than a judge to be biased against 
unusual religions.218 Therefore, the argument goes, adjudicating sincerity 
by jury trial would particularly disadvantage adherents of unusual 
minority religions.219 
The objection about jury bias is unproven. The most recent empirical 
studies, though not directly on point, call it into question. Jury pools tend 
to be more diverse than the corps of professional judges, and therefore 
more likely to identify with a wider array of claimants than judges as a 
whole. Moreover, any given jury is certain to be more diverse, just by 
virtue of numbers, than any given judge.220 Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
recent empirical studies suggest that juries are more likely than judges to 
side with victims of unconstitutional conduct than with the 
                                                     
Exception to the Criminal Law, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 239, 256 (2011). 
214. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
215. See also Mason, supra note 63, at 117–18 (arguing that “the constitutional prohibition on 
finding ‘religious beliefs’ to be ‘false’ must refer to the non-literal functions served, in context, by 
religious propositions” for Ballard to comply with Smith). 
216. Marshall, supra note 213, at 257. 
217. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).  
218. See, e.g., Krotozynski, supra note 17, at 1085 (“If pervasive social prejudice against new, 
oddball religions and religionists is a social fact, then protecting belief requires more than simply 
refraining from submitting the truth of a religion’s tenets to a jury.”); Lupu, supra note 17, at 955 
(“The bias built into standards of sincerity is aggravated by the allocation of functions in the judicial 
process.”); Noonan, supra note 18, at 719 (“Is a jury capable of discerning when the use of a symbol 
is insincere and hypocritical?”). 
219. See Krotozynski, supra note 17, at 1085. 
220. See Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury’s Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV. 189, 237–39 
(2015).  
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government.221 While I am aware of no empirical studies about the 
adjudication of religious sincerity, based on the evidence that is 
available to religious accommodation claimants and their lawyers, it is 
not obvious that they would opt for a bench trial. 
Some might respond to the concern about jury bias by pointing to the 
constitutional fact doctrine, by which an appellate court reviews de novo 
the facts relevant to a constitutional judgment. Some courts have 
extended the doctrine to justify de novo review of facts relevant to a 
statutory religious accommodation case.222 The constitutional fact 
doctrine should not justify de novo review of a claimant’s sincerity. In 
the first place, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow appellate 
courts to review de novo the credibility of a witness,223 a task that would 
likely be central to reviewing many adjudications of religious sincerity. 
More fundamentally, the doctrine is unprincipled and should be 
discarded. As I have argued elsewhere, a doctrine born of legitimate 
concern about southern bias against the speech rights of civil rights 
activists in one case224 has unfortunately become a power-grab whenever 
it suits federal appellate courts.225 
C. Evaluating Religious Sincerity 
Putting aside evidence of a religious belief’s accuracy, there are three 
categories of evidence that are relevant to a claimant’s sincerity: 
nonreligious incentives for a claimant to make an insincere religious 
claim; evidence that the claimant’s current religious claims do not “fit” 
with the claimant’s religious biography; and evidence that the claimant’s 
religious claims do not “fit” with the claimant’s religious community.226 
1. Insincerity Incentives 
Evidence that the accommodation sought by a claimant would be 
attractive to anyone, not just to religious objectors, may be powerful 
                                                     
221. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(2009). 
222. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 948 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.). 
223. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). 
224. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
225. Chapman, supra note 220, at 228–35. 
226. See Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(summarizing a religious sincerity analysis that accords with the overview here); Senn, supra note 
8, at 342 (cataloguing types of evidence relevant to adjudicating religious sincerity). 
06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:07 AM 
1232 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1185 
 
evidence of insincerity.227 Classic examples include financial windfalls 
and avoiding the danger of serving in the armed forces.228 Some 
conscientious objector cases involve both.229 American law has 
frequently tried to reduce incentives for insincere religious 
accommodation claims by requiring accommodated parties to perform 
alternative service.230 Such structural mechanisms can reduce the 
likelihood of insincere claims, and therefore the likelihood that a 
government official will have to inquire into a claimant’s sincerity, but 
they cannot foreclose insincere claims altogether. 
It is important to keep in mind that many religious accommodations 
do not give the accommodated party a benefit that would be attractive to 
everyone (or even to most people).231 The theoretical justification for a 
religious accommodation is that it removes a unique burden on those 
with a conflicting religious commitment, not that it provides them with a 
special benefit for having a religious belief.232 Hobby Lobby, for 
instance, did not stand to profit financially from declining to pay for 
employee insurance plans that covered certain forms of contraceptives; 
rather, the government argued that the plans virtually paid for 
themselves because the contraceptives would lower the overall cost of 
women’s healthcare.233 Likewise, few parents would prefer their 
adolescent children to work at home rather than to go to school, as the 
Amish parents sought in Wisconsin v. Yoder.234 And this is to say 
nothing of the costs—financial, emotional, and otherwise—entailed in 
                                                     
227. See Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 65. 
228. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (mail fraud); Ideal Life Church of Lake 
Elmo v. Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. 1981) (“The court found that the 
primary, and perhaps the sole, purpose for incorporating the Ideal Life Church was to provide the 
Rossow family with the benefit of a tax-free home while maintaining the same use and control they 
had prior to incorporation.”); David Bernstein, Miami Is Worth a Mass?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Aug. 7, 2009) http://volokh.com/2009/08/07/miami-is-worth-a-mass/ [https://perma.cc/F5TR-
ML32] (arguing that religious asylum may pose “a substantial risk of false conversions” and “a 
huge benefit being given to Iranians (and likely citizens of some other Muslim countries) who 
become Christian that is not given to Iranians who stay Muslim”). 
229. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 383 (1955) (claimant first claimed an 
exemption from the draft as a farmer, then as a conscientious objector, probably because he 
(understandably) didn’t want to exchange the financial benefits of tending the family farm for the 
costs of serving in the armed forces). 
230. See GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 122–23; McConnell, supra note 14, at 37. 
231. BRADY, supra note 20, at 203, 280. 
232. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 688 (1992). 
233. See Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 65. 
234. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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going to the trouble to seek a religious accommodation. The specter of 
litigation alone could deter the fainthearted, much less the false. 
In some cases, it is difficult to judge whether the accommodation 
would come packaged with a benefit that might be desirable to the 
insincere. Prisoners, for instance, may be less deterred by litigation, and 
may have a powerful incentive to request an accommodation to annoy or 
retaliate against prison officials.235 On the other hand, prisoners often 
request, and receive, religious accommodations that are not obviously 
universally desirable, especially related to dietary restrictions and 
fasts.236 
A word of caution about ulterior motives for religious claims is in 
order. Many litigants, in all kinds of cases, have multiple motives for 
bringing suit. To put it more precisely, they have multiple objectives and 
goals that they hope the suit will help them to realize—revenge, 
compensation, justice, the opportunity to tell their story, etc. Religious 
accommodation claimants may have multiple motives too. Evidence of 
multiple motives may or may not bear on whether the claimant is sincere 
about her religious exercise. Take Hobby Lobby, for instance. Suppose 
that the Green family that owns and controls Hobby Lobby had a range 
of motives for challenging the contraceptive mandate: they like free 
advertising; they are publicity hounds; they dislike President Obama; 
they dislike “socialized medicine”; they believe America should 
generally promote “pro-life” values; they don’t think anyone should ever 
use abortifacients, and they want to reduce the risk that anyone will; and 
they believe that it would violate their religion for their company to pay 
for contraceptive insurance for its employees. The last of these motives 
is the only one that matters for purposes of satisfying the sincerity 
requirement. Evidence of another motive may suggest a reason the 
claimant might lie about his religious exercise. But so long as the 
claimant establishes that he is sincere about his religious exercise, any 
other motives he may have for seeking an accommodation are legally 
beside the point. 
                                                     
235. See Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Evidence of nonobservance is 
relevant on the question of sincerity, and is especially important in the prison setting, for an inmate 
may adopt a religion merely to harass the prison staff with demands to accommodate his new 
faith.”). 
236. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 182 (4th Cir. 2006) (involving an accommodation 
from ordinary prison meal schedules so Muslim prisoners could fast from food during daylight in 
observance of Ramadan). Some prisoners would prefer a kosher diet, by contrast, simply because 
the food may be healthier or of a higher quality than the non-kosher prison food. 
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Moreover, many people don’t differentiate between their religious, 
social, political, cultural, and personal ethical beliefs.237 As John Locke 
noted long ago, all of these factors inform one’s conscience.238 Probably 
a number of religious accommodation claims arise from a conscientious 
objection shaped by multiple cultural influences, including religion. 
Most people are not trained philosophers or theologians, and they don’t 
have the time, interest, or intellectual resources to distinguish between 
beliefs compelled by their religion and the moral norms of their social 
network. For practical purposes, the two are one and the same for most 
people—maybe for everyone. I doubt that the sources of one’s 
conscientious judgments can be disentangled by anyone, let alone courts. 
Courts can determine whether a claimant holds her beliefs sincerely, and 
whether a source of those beliefs is religion.239 But they should be 
reluctant to dive into a claimant’s moral commitments to show that the 
claimant’s objection arises not from a sincere religious belief, but from 
being planted in front of Sesame Street as a child. 
2. Narrative Fit Evidence 
The most powerful evidence of religious insincerity may be evidence 
that claimants have stated or acted inconsistently with their alleged 
religious beliefs.240 A recorded statement by the claimant that he plans to 
manufacture a religious belief for purposes of litigation is, of course, 
pure gold. But short of that, evidence that the claimant has shifted 
religious views, apparently for purposes of litigation, is powerful.241 
Courts should be thoughtful about how they evaluate evidence of 
inconsistent conduct or statements, though. People change over time. 
Their religious beliefs change. What good is religious liberty if one can’t 
exercise it to change religious beliefs and conduct? Moreover, few live 
up to their ideals, whether they derive from religion or not. Many 
                                                     
237. Thanks to Hillel Levin for raising this point. 
238. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. I, ch. 3, § 8, at 66 
(Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (1690); see also Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and 
Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1489–90. 
239. See infra section V.A. 
240. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 281 (arguing that courts should “carefully tailor the questions 
that judges can ask and focus the inquiry on whether the individual’s free exercise claims are 
consistent with their overall conduct during the period of the dispute”). 
241. See, e.g., Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1963) (requiring 
appellant, member of the Reform Jewish faith, to proceed with trial after sundown on a Friday did 
not violate his religious liberty because “the trial court learned from appellant that he actually went 
to his office and worked on Saturdays” and he had declined to object to resetting the trial “for that 
day and hour”). 
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religions account for failure or sin, as well as repentance and 
forgiveness. Common experience, then, suggests that what courts (and 
claimants) ought to be primarily concerned about is not whether the 
claimant’s conduct and statements have always been a model of 
consistency, but whether the claimant’s asserted religious beliefs make 
sense with, or fit into, the claimant’s religious biography. If there are 
inconsistencies, a claimant may present evidence that accounts for them 
as expressions of religious exercise, such as conversion, 
“backsliding,”242 or good old-fashioned failure. Evidence that the current 
religious claim does not “fit” with the claimant’s religious narrative 
ought to weigh against the claimant’s sincerity.243 
A couple of cases are illustrative. In Witmer v. United States,244 the 
Supreme Court reviewed a denial of conscientious objector status.245 In 
his questionnaire, Witmer had requested an agricultural classification so 
he could continue working on his father’s farm and “bring more of [it] 
under cultivation and closed.”246 “For this reason,” he wrote, “I am 
appealing to you to grant me an agricultural classification as I assure you 
that I will increase production year after year, and contribute a 
satisfactory amount for the war effort and civilian use.”247 He “expressly 
disclaimed any ministerial exemption.”248 He did, however, claim to be a 
conscientious objector, stating that he was “required to maintain 
neutrality in the ‘combats of this world.’”249 He said he had never “given 
public expression to his conscientious objector views,” but he “claimed 
that he had demonstrated his convictions by studying the Bible and by 
telling others about God’s Kingdom and ‘of how He will put a stop to all 
wars.’”250 
When his local Selective Service Board denied his claim for 
classification as a farmer and conscientious objector, he offered a 
variation on this theme. He appealed the decision and requested 
classification as “a minister of the gospel.”251 The Appeal Board met 
                                                     
242. See generally Brady, supra note 11. 
243. See Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988). 
244. 348 U.S. 375 (1955). 
245. The Court reviewed the decision of the Selective Service System for whether it had any 
basis in fact. Id. at 381; see also Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). 
246. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 378. 




251. Id. at 379. 
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with Witmer. He told them he had left his job of three years at a hat 
factory. He presented an affidavit of a local officer of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses that he had engaged in the “preaching of the good news or 
gospel to others” “on many occasions,” stated that he carried Bibles and 
study aids from door to door, and said that “one could be ordained as a 
minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses without attending a seminary or 
performing funeral or marriage ceremonies.”252 In response to the 
prospect of serving as a noncombatant, he stated that he believed “the 
boy who makes the snow balls is just as responsible as the boy who 
throws them.”253 This claim was inconsistent with his initial “offer to 
contribute to the war effort” by running his father’s farm.254 Despite 
Witmer’s seeming religious sincerity in general, the government 
concluded that his inconsistent statements about ministry and about 
helping the war effort suggested that his religious pacifism was not 
thoroughgoing enough to support conscientious objector status.255 
Applying a “some evidence” standard, the Supreme Court upheld the 
classification.256 
Witmer’s case was a close call. Given his prior inconsistent 
statements, there was nothing wrong with requiring him to explain 
whether his prior statements were in conflict, in his mind, with his 
current claim, and if so, how they both fit into a coherent religious 
biography. Without stronger evidence of narrative fit, the board was 
justified in concluding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving 
his religious sincerity (even if it would have been justified in concluding 
the opposite). 
A more recent case arising under RFRA also illustrates the value of 
narrative fit evidence. In United States v. Adeyamo,257 the defendant 
sought to quash an indictment against him for importing leopard skins 
without a permit and without declaring them.258 He claimed that he used 
the skins for religious purposes as an adherent of a mixture of “the 
Yoruba religions and Catholicism.”259 He purported to believe “in the 
power of the Orisha known as Shango, and that he was intending to use 
                                                     
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 380. 
254. Id.  
255. Id. at 382–83. 
256. Id. at 383. 
257. 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
258. Id. at 1084. 
259. Id. at 1086. 
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all of the seized leopard skins for a religious initiation ceremony.”260 He 
also submitted declarations from experts to show that possessing and 
using leopard skins are consistent with the Yoruba religion.261 
To counter Adeyamo’s story, the government produced evidence that 
Adeyamo “stated to investigators that he was Catholic, and that he 
believed in Jesus Christ.”262 While that, alone, might suggest only that 
Adeyamo was an adherent of Santeria or another syncretistic variant of 
Christianity and an animistic religion, the government’s other evidence 
was more damning. According to Adeyamo’s “purported friend,” 
Adeyamo appeared to “despise[] the Santeria religion.”263 Adeyamo “did 
sell African items to individuals in the United States who practiced the 
Santeria religion but as soon as the sale was over, [he] physically moved 
away from these individuals to the other side of the room because he 
disliked the faith.”264 When Adeyamo’s friend stayed with him in 
Nigeria, Adeyamo “did not practice the Santeria religion nor a mixture 
of the Catholic and Santeria religion, but instead performed only 
Catholic services in his house.”265 On the basis of the conflicting 
evidence about Adeyamo’s religious consistency, the district court 
concluded that it could not determine Adeyamo’s sincerity without 
personally assessing Adeyamo’s credibility in an evidentiary hearing.266 
Since the court dismissed his motion on other grounds, there was no 
need for such a hearing.267 The court and the government were right to 
question Adeyamo’s religious sincerity given the evidence of his 
inconsistent past practice and statements. 
3. Community Fit Evidence 
More controversially, I suggest that courts should also consider 
evidence about whether the claimant’s alleged religious beliefs fit with 
the beliefs of the claimant’s religious community. Relying solely on 
such evidence to conclude that a claimant is insincere would effectively 
                                                     
260. Id. 
261. Id. 





267. The court dismissed Adeyamo’s motion on the ground that, assuming his sincerity, the 
government had satisfied its burden under RFRA to show that declining to accommodate religious 
objectors was the least restrictive way of achieving its compelling interest in protecting endangered 
leopards. Id.  
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favor mainstream religious beliefs, violating the no-orthodoxy 
principle.268 But allowing evidence that the claimant’s alleged beliefs are 
one-of-a-kind to supplement evidence that the claimant has ulterior 
motives for an accommodation, or that the claimant has acted or spoken 
inconsistently with the claim, reduces the no-orthodoxy concern without 
ignoring salient evidence. 
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in a Free Exercise 
Clause case.269 A Jehovah’s Witness steel worker asserted that his 
religious beliefs against participating in war would not allow him to 
construct tank turrets. When the worker resigned rather than perform 
work that violated his conscience, the Indiana Supreme Court denied his 
unemployment compensation claim on the ground that his objection was 
personal and not “religious,” partly because another Jehovah’s Witness 
“had no scruples about working on tank turrets.”270 The Supreme Court 
disagreed. “Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among 
followers of a particular creed.”271 With a nod to the “religious question” 
doctrine, and therefore the no-orthodoxy principle, the Court also noted 
that, “the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such 
differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.”272 But the Court did not 
place evidence of “community fit” completely out-of-bounds, at least for 
determining whether an accommodation claimant’s belief is “religious.” 
“One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly 
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the 
Free Exercise Clause; but . . . the guarantee of free exercise is not 
limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious 
sect.”273 
This analysis of evidence that some members (or the official organs) 
of the claimant’s religious community hold a contrary view of the 
                                                     
268. See, e.g., Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[W]here unorthodox 
beliefs are implicated . . . the factfinder’s temptation to merge sincerity and verity is as great as the 
need to guard against this conjugation.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 
F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981) (“A believer’s sincerity is also evaluated in light of the religion’s size 
and history . . . but this is not dispositive.”). 
269. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
270. Id. at 715 (“[A]t least, such work was ‘scripturally’ acceptable.”). 
271. Id.; see also Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (“It is not the place of the 
courts to deny a man the right to his religion simply because he is still struggling to assimilate the 
full scope of its doctrine.”). 
272. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715; see also id. at 716 (“Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not 
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow 
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of 
scriptural interpretation.”). 
273. Id. at 715–16. 
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religion’s requirements is spot-on. Such evidence may be relevant, both 
to show whether the claimant is motivated by religion, and whether the 
claimant is actually sincere.274 But it ought rarely, if ever, to be 
dispositive of sincerity. Particularly in a nation with a profoundly 
“democratized” religious sociology,275 few coreligionists are likely to 
believe all the same things; community beliefs and practices shape 
consciences, but they don’t press them into molds. 
Out of a concern that courts will favor well known religious beliefs 
over idiosyncratic claims, some scholars have suggested that courts 
should avoid considering the relationship of an accommodation 
claimant’s beliefs and those of the claimant’s co-religionists.276 They are 
concerned, rightly, with steering clear of the no-orthodoxy principle. In 
my view, the danger of this is sufficiently mitigated by insisting that 
courts may not rely solely on evidence that a claimant’s beliefs do not 
“fit” with the claimant’s religious community. Allowing courts to 
consider such evidence, which can obviously be probative of sincerity, 
in addition to evidence of ulterior motives or personal inconsistency, 
reduces the dangers of letting religious insincerity off the hook, and 
avoids asking courts to tolerate too much cognitive dissonance. 
4. Institutional Claimants 
Some religious accommodations extend to institutions. Most recently, 
the Court has held that the First Amendment entitles religious 
institutions to an accommodation from employment discrimination laws 
that would interfere with their employment decisions about 
“ministers.”277 It has also held that RFRA entitles closely-held for-profit 
                                                     
274. See Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The litigant’s assertion of 
a view so totally foreign to the creed with which he claimed to affiliate might well lead the court to 
question his sincerity.”). 
275. See generally NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 
(1989). 
276. BRADY, supra note 20, at 202 (“[T]he examination of whether the believer’s assertion of 
burden fits with their larger system of religious belief would impermissibly entangle courts in 
religious questions . . . Such determinations would involve courts in questions of religious doctrine 
that would exceed their expertise and role.”); see also id. (“[W]henever the claimant’s religious 
beliefs are unusual or seem implausible or unreasonable, there is a risk that the Court will find their 
claims to be insincere.”); GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 123 (“The undesirability of inquiries into 
sincerity, and especially the risk of discriminatory disbelief of the unorthodox, count against 
introducing a scheme of legal regulation in which officials must evaluate people’s honesty.”); 
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 590 (Can.) (“Requiring proof of the 
established practices of a religion to gauge the sincerity of belief diminishes the very freedom we 
seek to protect.”). 
277. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012). 
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corporations to an accommodation from a regulation requiring it to buy 
contraceptive insurance for employees.278 Should the sincerity analysis 
differ for organizations? 
In short, there seems to be no reason why institutions should be 
treated differently for purposes of a sincerity analysis. The law, 
ordinarily through institutional by-laws enforced by state law, 
determines who has authority to determine an institution’s policy, 
including its “religious exercise,” if any.279 Under a statute like RFRA, 
the requirement is that the claimant’s religious beliefs be sincere; 
responsibility for sincerity would seem to belong to whomever the law 
assigns authority to determine the institution’s religious “beliefs.” 
The hard question would be what to do if the law assigns 
responsibility for determining an institution’s religious beliefs to 
multiple people, some of whom cannot demonstrate their sincerity. 
Again, the question may ordinarily be resolved by by-laws. By-laws 
anticipate that officers may disagree and provide procedures for settling 
those disagreements and moving forward. If a sufficient number of 
officers necessary to the direct the corporation’s policy under its by-laws 
hold the asserted religious beliefs sincerely, then a court should conclude 
that the institution does too. In all events, the adjudication of the 
institution’s sincerity should be determined according to religiously-
neutral principles of law that govern the analysis of a corporation’s 
mental state in other contexts. 
In summary, I have argued that courts can, and should, adjudicate 
religious sincerity. They should consider evidence of ulterior motive, 
personal inconsistency, and idiosyncrasy. Though evidence of 
inaccuracy (and implausibility) is probative of insincerity, as Justice 
Jackson argued, it should be ruled out by the no-orthodoxy principle. 
The final part of this paper explores the conceptual relationship between 
sincerity and other components of a religious accommodation claim, 
including the “substantial burden” element that divided the justices in 
Hobby Lobby. 
                                                     
278. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014). 
279. See id. at 2775 (“State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, 
for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. Courts will turn to 
that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.” (citations omitted)). 
06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:07 AM 
2017] ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS SINCERITY 1241 
 
V. DISENTANGLING “SINCERITY,” “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE,” 
AND “SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN” 
So far, this Article has focused on how courts should adjudicate 
religious sincerity. It now explores one way courts should not adjudicate 
religious sincerity—by confusing it with other elements of an 
accommodation claim. Unfortunately, courts do confuse these 
elements,280 and this confusion probably makes it harder for courts to 
resist suspicion creep. When insincerity is not an issue in the case, courts 
should avoid allowing their suspicion to affect their legal analysis. 
Hopefully, understanding the sincerity analysis will help to disentangle 
and clarify other components of a religious accommodation claim, 
especially “religious exercise” and “substantial burden.” 
A. Disentangling “Sincerity” and “Religious Exercise” 
A religious accommodation claimant must show not only sincerity, 
but also that the government (or employer’s) regulation creates a 
“substantial burden” on the claimant’s “religious exercise.”281 These 
three concepts are distinguishable. This Article has already discussed the 
concept of sincerity at some length, distinguishing it from accuracy.282 
Whether a claimant’s allegations are sincere should also be distinguished 
from whether the claimant’s alleged “religious exercise” is 
“religious.”283 
Whether the religiosity of a claimant’s beliefs is an issue depends 
upon the legal basis for the claimed accommodation. Some provisions 
offer an accommodation for any moral objection, whether based on 
religion or not.284 The state and federal provisions that give rise to most 
accommodation claims, however, extend expressly to the exercise of 
                                                     
280. See supra notes 22–29. 
281. See Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016). 
A claim under the Free Exercise Clause must also show, as a precursor, that the regulation is not 
“neutral and of general applicability.” See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 531 (1993). 
282. See supra Part VI. 
283. See Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2007) (Tjoflat, J., 
dissenting) (“[f]ree exercise jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff plead both sincerity and the 
religious character of the plaintiff’s belief” otherwise “any sincere act is sacrosanct—and potentially 
subject to constitutional protection”). 
284. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2016) (“The [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] 
will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which 
are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”).  
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religion.285 Requiring the claimant’s objection to be based on religion, 
therefore, is simply a matter of fidelity to the legal provision that 
authorizes an accommodation. 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the meaning of 
“religion” in constitutional or statutory law, but courts tend to read the 
word generously.286 Ordinarily it covers not only traditional western and 
eastern religions but also a wide range of beliefs, practices, and 
communities that sociologists and anthropologists define as religions.287 
Faced with hard cases regarding the scope of “religion” or “religious 
exercise,288 courts have broadly construed the concept to ensure a liberal 
equality among those who hold diverse beliefs, including beliefs that 
may be changing or novel.289 
In the nature of language, however, “religion” cannot mean 
everything.290 The most obvious beliefs that religion does not describe 
are those that the adherent insists are not religious. Foisting “religious” 
liberty on someone who disavows religion would certainly be ironic. 
This is not to say that nonreligious people are not entitled to religious 
liberty—they are entitled to be nonreligious, and to exercise their belief 
that religion is bunk.291 It is only to say that an objection to complying 
with a law that does not arise from religious beliefs (including atheistic 
beliefs) does not entail an “exercise” of “religion.” 
In addition, claims based on religious parodies are not religious. They 
arise from parodies of religious exercise, not the exercise of religion.292 
                                                     
285. See supra Part III. 
286. For a fairly comprehensive account of how courts have defined religion under different 
constitutional and statutory provisions, see generally Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 
102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002). Judge Adams provided an influential account in a concurring opinion 
in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in result). 
287. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 89–137 
(2005); Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 
587–604; Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 532 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 
CALIF. L. REV. 753, 756–62, 776–807 (1984); Koppelman, supra note 65; Jeffrey Omar Usman, 
Defining Religion, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123 (2007); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of 
Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 814–21 (1997) (arguing for an “evolving” constitutional definition of 
religion). 
288. One, in my view, was Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a fortune-teller’s business was not an exercise of “religion”). 
289. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212–13 
(Adams, J., concurring in result). 
290. What “religious” or “religion” means in a statute is a question of law; whether the 
claimant’s alleged beliefs are “religious” is a question of fact. 
291. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005). 
292. See, e.g., Michelle Boorstein, For Georgetown ‘Apostles,’ a Rowhouse Rebellion, WASH. 
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The claimant may sincerely believe in the political or ethical objects of 
the parody, but that doesn’t mean that the activity is a religion, or that 
the claimant sincerely holds religious beliefs. For instance, the Satanic 
Temple appears to be a parody of religion that has the purpose of 
eliminating the display of traditional religious faith in public spaces.293 
No doubt the founder and adherents sincerely believe these things should 
happen. This does not mean, however, that the Temple’s proposed 
“After School Satan Club,” for example, is an exercise of religion.294 
The Club may be protected, like the Good News Club or a Ku Klux Klan 
Club, under the public forum doctrine of the Free Speech Clause,295 but 
it is unclear whether the Club is entitled to a religious accommodation 
because it is unclear whether the Club exercises religion. 
Courts seem to do a fairly good job at sniffing out religious parodies, 
even those based on nonreligious beliefs to which the claimant is 
sincerely committed.296 Consider again the Flying Spaghetti Monster 
case, Cavanaugh v. Bartelt.297 Recall that a prisoner alleged an 
adherence to “FMSism” and claimed a right under RLUIPA to various 
accommodations from ordinary prison regulations (including the right to 
wear a pirate costume and to celebrate communion in the form of a large 
bowl of pasta). The court assumed for purposes of analysis that the 
                                                     
POST (Nov. 11, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/10/AR2006 
111001978.html [http://perma.cc/2JZ5-EFSM]; NCC Staff, When Festivus Was Recognized as a 
Religion for Several Months, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY. (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/when-festivus-was-recognized-as-a-religion-for-several-months  
[http://perma.cc/E3QZ-LXN4].  
293. See Katherine Stewart, An After School Satan Club Could Be Coming to Your Kid’s 
Elementary School, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education 
/an-after-school-satan-club-could-be-coming-to-your-kids-elementary-school/2016/07/30/63f485e6-
5427-11e6-88eb-7dda4e2f2aec_story.html [http://perma.cc/NCD2-QV5C]. 
294. See Katherine Stewart & Moriah Balingit, Several School Districts Say After School Satan 




295. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753 (1995). 
296. See, e.g., Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (reviewing district court judgment on grounds that “[n]o reasonable juror could 
infer . . . that Mooney’s religion is anything more than a strongly held belief in the importance or 
benefits of marijuana”); Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819 (D. Neb. 2016) (prisoner’s 
commitment to the ideology that inspired the Flying Spaghetti Monster and “FMSism” was not 
religious); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995) (defendant’s beliefs in the 
“Church of Marijuana” was not religious).  
297. 178 F. Supp. 819 (2016). 
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claimant was sincere, but concluded that FSMism is not a religion.298 It 
began as a satire of the intelligent design movement.299 Its “religious” 
incidents seem to be designed to mock traditional religion. At its core, 
FSMism likely expresses a sincere belief about the nature of the universe 
and a sincere belief that public schools should teach science a particular 
way. But exercising speech rights to parody religion is not the exercise 
of religion. 
On the other hand, courts sometimes construe religion too narrowly. 
In Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield,300 the court considered 
whether a fortune-teller’s services amounted to an exercise of religion. 
The claimant held eclectic beliefs on which she based her “psychic and 
spiritual counsel[ing],” including “‘[s]pirituality, astrology, 
Reiki . . . Kabala’” and “a strong belief in the ‘words and teachings of 
Jesus’ . . . and a belief in ‘the New Age Movement,’ which [she] 
describes as ‘a decentralized Western spiritual movement that seeks 
Universal Truth and the attainment of the highest individual 
potential.’”301 The court concluded that, “Moore[-]King’s beliefs more 
closely resemble personal and philosophical choices consistent with a 
way of life, not deep religious convictions shared by an organized group 
deserving of constitutional solicitude.”302 The court emphasized that 
Moore-King was largely responsible for curating her own beliefs, and 
that those beliefs were not dominated by beliefs promoted by an 
institution. While this may be a rational way to define religious exercise, 
it is not the most generous that courts have offered.303 More importantly, 
it risks running afoul of the no-orthodoxy principle for favoring 
communal beliefs and practices over those that are privately curated. 
The notion of religion is surely robust enough to embrace a mosaic of 
beliefs and practices that are undoubtedly individually religious, no 
matter how distasteful such religious consumerism may be to some. 
A harder legal question is whether the Constitution requires extending 
religious accommodations to beliefs and practices that are motivated 
                                                     
298. Id. at 824. It is quite possible that the claimant sincerely believed some doctrines of 
FMSism, since they are stated in equivocal terms and he presented evidence suggesting his 
sincerity, including the fact that he had “several tattoos proclaiming his faith.” See id. at 827. 
299. Id. at 824–26. 
300. 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013). 
301. Id. at 564. 
302. Id. at 571 (relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972)). 
303. See generally Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002). 
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strictly by sincere nonreligious conscientious objections.304 Though 
religious and nonreligious conscientious objections are conceptually 
distinct, there are often good reasons to extend accommodations to 
both.305 When an accommodation provision expressly does so, of course, 
a court need not concern itself with whether the conscientious objection 
is based on religion. When a provision extends only to religious 
exercise, though, courts can, and should, distinguish between whether 
the exercise is “religious” and whether it is “sincere.” 
Just as with the claimant’s sincerity, a court has an independent 
responsibility to determine whether the claimant’s exercise is religious. 
Unfortunately, courts have not been consistent on this score.306 Just as 
with any other legal provision, the meaning of “religion” or “religious” 
under an accommodation provision is a question of law.307 Whether a 
claimant’s belief or exercise is religious is thus a mixed question of law 
and fact. The claimant’s assertion that the belief or exercise is religious 
is one—but only one—fact relevant to the legal inquiry. As in Moore-
King, courts should independently evaluate whether the claimant’s 
exercise is religious. Otherwise the claimant has the final word on 
whether her claim is based on religious exercise. As long as the court has 
adopted a sufficiently generous notion of religion, the no-orthodoxy 
principle does not require courts to defer to the claimant about whether 
her beliefs qualify. Doing so would essentially deputize sincere 
claimants to extend the scope of religious liberty ad infinitum.308 
B. Disentangling “Sincerity” and “Substantial Burden” 
A religious accommodation claimant must also show that the 
regulation imposes a “substantial burden” on his “religious exercise.” 
Whether the government regulation substantially burdens the claimant’s 
religious exercise is a question of law. Assuming that the act or omission 
at issue is religious and sincere, the court must determine whether the 
government’s regulation burdens that act or omission, and if so, whether 
the burden is substantial. 
                                                     
304. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See generally Gregory P. Magrarian, How 
to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1903 (2001); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1351 (2012).  
305. Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457. 
306. See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007). 
307. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972). 
308. See Watts, 495 F.3d at 1303 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (“To interpret the First Amendment in 
such a fashion would stretch the scope of free exercise claims to an untenable degree.”). 
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1. The Hobby Lobby Mess 
Hobby Lobby muddied the meaning of substantial burden. The 
majority and the dissenting justices fundamentally disagreed about how 
to evaluate whether the contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial 
burden on the claimant’s religious exercise. To make matters worse, 
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, failed to clearly address Justice 
Ginsburg’s allegation that he had reduced the substantial burden analysis 
to one about sincerity. The resulting confusion is entirely unnecessary in 
light of RFRA’s text and historical background.309 
The confusion arises from the nature of Hobby Lobby’s claims. 
Hobby Lobby had a sincere religious objection to doing a particular 
thing: buying insurance for employees that would cover certain 
contraceptives.310 The reason Hobby Lobby objected to paying for such 
insurance is that the owners of Hobby Lobby believe that those 
contraceptives may in at least some cases result in the death of an 
innocent human being.311 Their religion, as they understand it, forbids 
them from knowingly paying for contraceptives that entail such a risk.312 
The government did not question the owner’s sincerity or whether their 
beliefs were religious.313 
The majority and the dissenting justices disagreed about whether the 
contraceptive insurance mandate placed a “substantial burden” on 
Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise. The majority concluded that the 
financial penalties that the government would be entitled to levy against 
Hobby Lobby for failing to comply with the mandate constituted a 
substantial burden.314 The dissenting justices thought this was the wrong 
                                                     
309. I share Paul Horwitz’s view that “credit (or blame)” for the decision in Hobby Lobby “lies” 
“not with Justice Alito’s opinion” “but with RFRA, which supplies the propulsion in both Hobby 
Lobby and Chief Justice Roberts’s equally clear opinion in Gonzales v. O Centro Epírita 
Beneficente União do Vegetal.” Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 
165 (2014). Accordingly, my analysis of what counts as a “substantial burden” relies on ordinary 
methods of statutory interpretation. To me, whether an accommodation in any given case is morally 
or politically desirable is another matter. 
310. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014). 
311. Id.  
312. Id. at 2766. 
313. As Professor Gedicks has argued, it is possible that the government did not contest Hobby 
Lobby’s sincerity because it would entail an “expensive” “fishing expedition” into the contraceptive 
habits of the Green family by which “a jury would be repulsed.” Gedicks, supra note 28, at 112. 
Given the sheer volume of contraceptive mandate accommodation claims, however, the most likely 
explanation is probably that the government wanted a clean sweep on the legal issues rather than to 
fight each case on the facts.  
314. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.  
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way to look at it. Instead, Justice Ginsburg argued that there was no 
substantial burden because the wrongs that Hobby Lobby did not want to 
be involved in—the killing of innocent human beings—were simply too 
attenuated from what the mandate required Hobby Lobby to do—pay for 
insurance for employees who have a legal right to use such 
contraceptives.315 Ginsburg thought the majority merged the sincerity 
and substantial burden analyses.316 She apparently perceived the Court 
as seeing itself legally obligated to accept not only that the claimant 
sincerely believed that its religion forbade complicity in its employees’ 
use of certain contraceptives, but also that the claimant sincerely 
believed that the regulation was a substantial burden on its religious 
exercise. Justice Alito, writing for the Court, unfortunately failed to 
clarify the difference between those two concepts. 
2. Sorting It Out 
Hobby Lobby raised novel legal questions; the “substantial burden” 
inquiry was not one of them.317 Once a claimant has established the fact 
of a sincere religious belief, the court decides, as a matter of law, 
whether the regulation at issue substantially burdens the claimant’s 
religious exercise.318 This entails identifying and evaluating three things: 
(1) what is the claimant’s religious exercise?319 (2) does the regulation 
burden that exercise? and (3) is the burden “substantial”?320 The 
principal dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby made an error at the first 
step that doomed its analysis of the others.321 
Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise,” for purposes of the statute, was 
abstaining from paying for contraceptive insurance. That exercise is the 
only relevant act or omission for determining Hobby Lobby’s “religious 
exercise” because it is what the mandate required and what Hobby 
                                                     
315. Id. at 2799.  
316. See Gedicks, supra note 28, at 119 n.118; Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 
38–39 (reading the majority opinion likewise). 
317. In my view, the most difficult legal questions were whether RFRA protects closely held 
for-profit corporations and whether the government had satisfied the “least restrictive means” 
requirement. I filed a brief supporting the claimants, arguing that the Establishment Clause did not 
prohibit their requested accommodation. 
318. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.  
319. See Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 Fed. App’x 815, 818 (2003) (“[T]he 
requisite nexus between the objection to immunization and plaintiff’s religious beliefs—if any—had 
not been shown.”). 
320. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015); Oklevueha Native Am. Church of 
Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2016). 
321. See infra notes 355–57. 
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Lobby objected to doing.322 The reason Hobby Lobby objected to that 
act or omission was the Greens’ religiously-informed moral beliefs 
about facilitating sin. 
Michael Dorf has argued that “[n]either the text nor the legislative 
history of RFRA provides any clear indication of how courts ought to 
determine whether an incidental burden on religion is in fact 
substantial.”323 Although the statute does not define “substantial,” and 
the legislative history may be silent on that precise point, the statute was 
intended to implement the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Sherbert 
v. Verner324 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.325 The burdens in those cases were, 
respectively, the denial of employment benefits,326 and criminal 
conviction and the imposition of a five-dollar fine.327 
With respect to whether the government can be said to “burden” a 
claimant’s conduct that the claimant believes to be wrong because it 
would facilitate another’s sinful conduct, a case that followed Sherbert’s 
reasoning is directly on point. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division,328 a steel worker objected to 
manufacturing tank turrets.329 The reason was because he believed that 
doing so would facilitate others to do something he believed to be 
sinful—making war.330 By contrast, Thomas was willing to work in the 
same plant in the roll foundry.331 Because he declined to work on tank 
turrets, though, he lost his job.332 Indiana declined to extend 
unemployment benefits to him.333 The Supreme Court concluded that 
this impermissibly burdened his religious exercise.334 
                                                     
322. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990) 
(focusing on whether “the mere act of paying the tax, by itself, violates [the objector’s] sincere 
religious beliefs”). 
323. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 
1213 (1996). 
324. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012) (“The purposes of this chapter are (1) to restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened.”). 
326. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963). 
327. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08, 220–21 (1972). 
328. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
329. Id. at 710–11. 
330. Id.  
331. Id.   
332. Id.  
333. Id. at 712. 
334. Id. at 720. 
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With respect to Thomas’s moral reasoning, which allowed him to 
work in the same plant, but not on tank turrets, the Court stated: 
“Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was 
an unreasonable one.”335 Once the government had determined that 
Thomas’s beliefs were sincere and religious, it could not reject his claim 
on the ground that it found his religiously-inspired moral reasoning to be 
unpersuasive. The rationale for this limit, of course, is the no-orthodoxy 
principle. If a court can reject a claim on the ground that the law simply 
cannot countenance the claimant’s religiously-inspired moral reasoning, 
it effectively favors other forms of religiously-inspired moral reasoning, 
which threatens religious liberty and equality. 
Just as in Thomas, the “religious exercise” to which Hobby Lobby 
objected was a particular act that Hobby Lobby believed would facilitate 
sin.336 Determining that Hobby Lobby was sincere and engaged in 
religious exercise did not even begin the “substantial burden” analysis. 
Hobby Lobby was still required to show two things as a matter of law: 
the government imposed a “burden” on its religious exercise, and the 
burden was “substantial.”337 
To decide whether there is a “substantial burden,” a court must 
determine whether the government’s regulation, as a matter of law, 
forbids or requires the “religious exercise” at issue.338 Professor Gedicks 
has argued that courts are so deferential to a claimant’s view about a 
“substantial burden” that the standard is “effectively established by the 
claimant’s mere say-so.”339 It is true that there has never been a great 
deal of Supreme Court precedent on what counts as a substantial burden. 
But the standard, as applied by the Supreme Court in prior cases, has 
sufficient content to guide a court’s independent judgment and to place 
limits on what forms of government regulation may count as a 
“substantial burden.”340 
First, it should be emphasized that a court has an independent duty to 
determine the meaning of the challenged government regulation, and 
thereby to determine whether it will actually operate the way that the 
claimant alleges. Whether the claimant sincerely believes that the law 
forbids or requires her religious exercise is irrelevant. Courts should not 
                                                     
335. Id. at 715. 
336. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765–66 (2014).  
337. Id. at 2775. 
338. See, e.g., id. at 2779, 2798–99. 
339. Gedicks, supra note 28, at 98. 
340. For an outline of the Supreme Court cases touching on the issue, see VOLOKH, supra note 
61, at 1068–69. 
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subject the meaning and application of a law to a claimant’s religious 
belief. While courts must defer to a claimant’s sincere and religious-
based mistake of fact (about whether the exercise at issue is really 
immoral), they must not defer to the claimant’s sincere and religious-
based mistake of law (that the challenged regulation actually requires the 
conduct to which the claimant objects). 
Second, the Supreme Court has decided some cases that set guidelines 
for the outer boundaries of a substantial burden. On the one hand, a 
criminal conviction (even one that carries a minor penalty)341 and the 
denial of important government benefits (unemployment compensation) 
impose “substantial” burdens on religious exercise.342 It is unclear 
whether a court would, or should, hold that a de minimis civil penalty, 
an administrative inconvenience, a minor licensing fee, or the denial of 
an “unimportant” benefit would amount to a “substantial burden” on 
religious exercise. Surely context matters. 
On the other hand, the Court has made clear that some categories of 
government regulation do not impose a substantial burden on religious 
exercise. For instance, in Bowen v. Roy,343 the claimant opposed the 
government’s use of his daughter’s social security number on the ground 
that it violated his religious belief for anyone to identify his daughter 
with a number.344 The Supreme Court held that “[t]he Federal 
Government’s use of a Social Security number for Little Bird of the 
Snow does not itself in any degree impair Roy’s ‘freedom to believe, 
express, and exercise’ his religion.”345 The Court likewise applied this 
principle when a Native American tribe objected to the government’s 
plan to build a road through federal land that was sacred to the tribe.346 
                                                     
341. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
342. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
343. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
344. Id. at 700–01 (quotation omitted); see also id. at 700 n.6 (“Roy’s religious views may not 
accept this distinction between individual and government conduct. It is clear, however, that the 
Free Exercise Clause, and the Constitution generally, recognize such a distinction; for the 
adjudication of a constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual’s religion, must 
supply the frame of reference.” (internal citation omitted)). 
345. Id. at 700. 
346. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988). I am 
inclined to agree with Justice Brennan that the regulation at issue placed a substantial burden on the 
claimants because it made it impossible for the claimants to engage in religious conduct. See id. at 
458–60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is important to note, however, that some Native American 
accommodation claims involving federal land use do not implicate the claimant’s religious conduct. 
Under the notion of “substantial burden” articulated above, those claims, like the one in Bowen v. 
Roy, would fail to show a substantial burden on the claimants’ religious exercise. See, e.g., 
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 
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These cases, though controversial,347 illustrate the relationship 
between an “exercise of religion” and whether there is a substantial 
burden on that exercise. While the claimants’ beliefs about what the 
government ought to do with its own property or program were in some 
sense a “religious exercise,” the claimants did not believe that they were 
obligated to do or to abstain from an act that the government forbade or 
required. As a result, the court concluded that the regulation did not 
“substantially burden” their exercise. The cases may be read two 
different but complementary ways: to hold that a religious belief about 
what the government may or may not do does not amount to religious 
“exercise” for purposes of an accommodation claim; or to hold that 
government conduct that does not directly regulate or effect a claimant’s 
religiously-motivated act or omission does not impose a “substantial 
burden” on the claimant’s religious exercise. Either way, the cases 
illustrate an important limit on the accommodation of sincere religious 
exercise, a limit the court must independently evaluate before the 
government is obligated to show that the regulation is the least 
restrictive way to achieve a compelling interest. 
The foregoing limits on what constitutes a “substantial burden” may 
not be a model of precision, and they are certainly capacious. But 
tallying these “secular costs” is not, contrary to detractors, “effectively” 
deferring to the “claimant’s mere say-so,”348 nor does it render the 
“substantial burden element functionally nonjusticiable.”349 Indeed, 
before Hobby Lobby, scholars tended to challenge the Supreme Court’s 
application of the “substantial burden” element for protecting too little 
religious exercise, not too much.350 
This account of “substantial burden” largely coincides with the 
Court’s approach in Hobby Lobby. The Court accepted as true that 
Hobby Lobby had a sincere religious objection to paying for 
contraceptive insurance (its “religious exercise”); that the contraceptive 
mandate “burdened” that exercise by requiring Hobby Lobby to do the 
                                                     
Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
347. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: 
Asserting A Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062–67 (2005); Allison M. 
Dussias, Ghost Dance and the Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization 
Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 774–75 
(1997). 
348. Gedicks, supra note 28, at 98. 
349. Id. at 101. 
350. See Lupu, supra note 17, at 936 (“[T]he law [about burdens on religious exercise] that has 
emerged thus far creates an intolerable risk of discrimination against unconventional religious 
practices and beliefs.”). 
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opposite; and that the burden was “substantial” because of the financial 
penalties for noncompliance.351 Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s claim, 
this did not “collapse” sincerity and substantial burden.352 It gave both of 
them their due. Unfortunately, in attempting to respond to the dissent’s 
critique, the Court stated that, “it is not for us to say that their religious 
beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”353 This choice of words was 
confusing. The Court probably meant that it could not determine the 
centrality or importance of the claimant’s religious belief consistent with 
the no-orthodoxy principle. But using “insubstantial” may have 
reinforced the dissenting justices’ concern that the Court was collapsing 
the sincerity and substantial burden inquiries. As the Court elsewhere 
emphasized, however, the object of a substantial burden analysis is not 
the sincerity or “centrality” of a claimant’s religious exercise, but the 
governmental benefits and burdens that depend on the claimant 
abandoning it.354 
The account above differs considerably from the dissenting justices’ 
approach. Rather than evaluating whether the regulation placed a 
“substantial burden” on Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise,” Justice 
Ginsburg evaluated whether Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise”—
declining to pay for contraceptive insurance—was too causally 
attenuated from the employees’ potential use of those contraceptives.355 
Ginsburg seems to have collapsed Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise” 
and the reason for that exercise. Perhaps Ginsburg simply did not think 
that RFRA should protect the religious exercise at issue in Hobby Lobby, 
and was determined to show that the claimants ought to lose on every 
element.356 But determining as a matter of law that RFRA does not apply 
                                                     
351. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
352. Id. at 2799.  
353. Id. at 2779. 
354. Id. at 2778, 2792. 
355. A number of scholars have likewise argued that whether a law places a “substantial burden” 
on a claimant’s religious exercise depends on the distance between the regulated conduct (of the 
claimant) and the ultimate conduct of another to which the claimant objects. Some think that forced 
payment of money can be a substantial burden on religious exercise and some don’t. Compare, e.g., 
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2015) (concluding that forced payment is a substantial burden but, 
because taxes are a forced payment too, there is no “less restrictive” means for the government to 
achieve its interests), with Gedicks, supra note 28, at 123–24 (arguing that courts should evaluate 
whether forced complicity with sin substantially burdens a claimant’s religious exercise). I don’t 
think the causal connection matters for the “substantial burden” analysis because the burden is a 
question of what the government does to coerce the claimant’s religious exercise, not the claimant’s 
moral reasoning for that exercise.  
356. Justices Breyer and Kagan, by contrast, did not join Justice Ginsburg’s opinion on whether 
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to complicity claims would be inconsistent with the statute’s text, which 
protects “religious exercise” without conditioning that protection on the 
sort of theological or moral reasoning behind that exercise. It would also 
be inconsistent with Thomas, in which the Court extended Sherbert to 
protect a complicity claim that was conceptually very similar to Hobby 
Lobby’s.357 
Worse, Justice Ginsburg’s approach is in tension with the no-
orthodoxy principle, for it suggests that religious accommodations 
should be available for some forms of religiously-inspired moral 
reasoning but not for others.358 Carefully distinguishing between 
religious sincerity and whether a government regulation imposes a 
“substantial burden” on the claimant’s religious exercise may reduce this 
risk. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to clarify the sincerity requirement of a 
religious accommodation claim. Scholars, and occasionally judges, have 
suggested that the First Amendment forbids the government from 
adjudicating a religious claimant’s sincerity. This Article has argued to 
the contrary. The Constitution forbids the government from determining 
the accuracy or plausibility of a claimant’s religious beliefs, but not from 
adjudicating the sincerity with which the claimant holds them. Courts 
can and should evaluate a claimant’s sincerity, when an opponent puts it 
in issue, to protect others from the costs of accommodating insincere 
religious claims. Furthermore, courts should distinguish between a 
                                                     
RFRA protects closely held for-profit corporations. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 (Breyer 
and Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
357. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 309, at 156 (“The polarizing nature of the issue, and of the Court’s 
decision, was both reflected in and encouraged by Justice Ginsburg’s stinging dissent.”).  
358. Cf. Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious 
Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1908 (2015) (“[W]e are, in many 
cases, without the moral clarity or authority to challenge someone’s belief that the conduct legally 
required of him would make him complicit in what he perceives as wrong.”). Some scholars have 
suggested that courts can avoid violating the “religious question doctrine” by evaluating complicity 
by analogy to religiously-neutral legal norms of causation and responsibility. Gedicks, supra note 
28, at 130–32; see also Elizabeth Sepper, Substantiating the Burdens of Compliance, 2016 U. ILL. 
L. REV. ONLINE 53, 59 (noting that courts “regularly apply principles of proximity, causation, and 
attenuation in a variety of First Amendment contexts”). Even if a judge could do so without 
selecting from among a variety of legal causation doctrines one that that merely corresponded with 
the judge’s own moral views, a legal focus on complicity is misplaced. As explained above, the 
statutory question is whether the government’s regulation substantially burdens the claimant’s 
religious exercise, defined as the claimant’s act or omission, not the reason for the claimant’s 
religious exercise. See supra Part V. 
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claimant’s sincerity, the claimant’s religious exercise, and whether the 
government has placed a substantial burden on that exercise. Contrary to 
the received scholarly wisdom, carefully adjudicating religious sincerity 
may actually do more to promote than to undermine religious liberty. 
